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Trade secret misappropriation claims are increasingly utilized as
a mechanism for enforcing intellectual property rights.' While the law
governing patent infringement claims has been developed over the en-
tire length of our nation's history, trade secret law remains compara-
tively undeveloped. This is particularly true in the area of damages
* Associate, Kirkland & Ellis, Chicago, IL.; J.D., Northwestern University School of Law;
M.B.A., The University of Chicago; B.S./B.A., State University of New York at Buffalo. The
views expressed in this article are solely those of the author and do not necessarily reflect those of
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1. See, e.g., Felix Prandl, Damages for Misappropriation of Trade Secret, 22 TORT & INS.
L.J. 447, 456 (1987) ("Trade secret litigation has become an important factor of competition in
certain areas of business, such as the high-tech or the chemical industry.").
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analysis, where the Supreme Court and the Federal Circuit have laid
down bright-line rules in constructing a body of precedent that may
be used in applying judicial scrutiny to damages claims in the context
of patent infringement. This body of precedent stands in stark con-
trast to the patchwork of decisions by various courts applying the law
of different states in analyzing claims for trade secret misappropria-
tion.' In part because trade secret law is based on state law, there is a
greater diversity in the rules that may be applicable in the context of
trade secret damages claims despite efforts to provide a basis for uni-
form rules.3 Moreover, at bottom, the number of cases addressing
damages-related issues in the context of trade secret misappropriation
is far fewer than those addressing damages in the context of patent in-
fringement claims.
While better-developed patent law rules may not be applicable to
trade secret misappropriation claims in every context, application of
uniform criteria is particularly appropriate in the context of damages
analysis. After all, the rules governing damages ultimately flow from
economic principles that should not depend upon jurisdictional idio-
syncrasies. Indeed, courts analyzing trade secret claims have intermit-
tently applied frameworks developed in evaluating patent infringe-
ment claims. Nonetheless, despite the close parallels, the law
regarding trade secret damages remains relatively undeveloped in
many respects.4
This article attempts to demonstrate how damages principles that
have been developed in the context of patent infringement claims can
2. See generally M. Rosenhouse, Annotation, Proper Measure and Elements of Damages for
Misappropriation of Trade Secrets, 11 A.L.R. 4th 12 (1982) (summarizing case law).
3. See Telex Corp. v. IBM Corp., 510 F.2d 894, 930 (10th Cir. 1975) ("[U]nfortunately the
general law as to the proper measure of damages in a trade secrets case is far from uniform.");
Am. Sales Corp. v. Adventure Travel, Inc., 862 F. Supp. 1476, 1479 (E.D. Va. 1994) ("Comput-
ing damages in a trade secrets case is not cut and dry."); Litton Sys., Inc. v. Ssangyong Cement
Indus. Co., 1993 WL 317266, at *1 (N.D. Ca. 1993); id. at *2 (observing that the principles gov-
erning trade secret damages "allow broad latitude in fashioning appropriate remedies");
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 45 Reporters' Note (1995) ("The cases
reflect considerable flexibility in the calculation of appropriate monetary relief in trade secret ac-
tions."); ABA MODEL JURY INSTRUCTIONS § 8.06[4], at 400 (3d ed. 1996) (in trade secret
cases, "lost profits, unjust enrichment, gains, or other benefits are not consistently applied con-
cepts from jurisdiction to jurisdiction, and may be subject to differing standards under various
state laws").
4. There also seems to be a lack of scholarly commentary on this topic. See MELVIN F.
JAGER, TRADE SECRET LAW § 7.03 (2001); Craig N. Johnson, Assessing Damages for Misappro-
priation of Trade Secrets, COLO. LAW., AUG. 1998, at 71 [hereinafter Johnson, Assessing Dam-
ages]; Prandl, supra note 1, at 447-48 ("Courts have not yet uniformly decided on the standards
applicable to trade secret damages.... To date, courts have not developed a clear and consistent
theory of trade secret damages."); Rosenhouse, supra note 2; William F. Johnson, Jr., Remedies in
Trade Secret Law, 72 Nw. U. L. REV. 1004 (1978).
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be adapted and applied in the context of trade secret claims. Courts
should look more readily to the well-developed body of patent law in
fashioning the rules governing damages in trade secret misappropria-
tion cases. Adoption of such principles, modified where necessary to
better fit the trade secret context, is likely to have the salutary effect of
increasing the scrutiny given trade secret damages claims-weeding
out those claims that are not sufficiently reliable to justify their sub-
mission to a jury.
Courts in patent infringement cases have developed rigorous
standards for testing and constraining damages claims.6 Increasingly,
courts exclude methodologically flawed damages theories under tradi-
tional damages principles or under the rubric of Daubert v. Merrell
Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.7 Arguably, such rigorous standards are
even more appropriate in the context of trade secrets, which by their
very nature, are often less concrete and intangible in terms of their
value than a patent, which by definition must define a complete and
workable process or machine.8 Trade secrets often relate to some
small part of a process or machine and, by their very existence as "se-
crets," may not be as readily subject to valuation in the marketplace.
Because plaintiffs increasingly invoke both trade secret law and these
factors inherent in trade secret claims, applying such rigorous stan-
dards is both appropriate and desirable. Indeed, recent trade secret
cases have increasingly applied either traditional damages principles or
5. At least one commentator has observed that parties historically have often been free to
proffer whatever theory they deemed appropriate and submit that theory to the jury:
A review of recent trade secret cases does not offer a single solution to the damage is-
sue. In many cases, courts have been guided by the parties' arguments and proof at
trial. Trial counsel preparing for trade secret litigation is largely free to choose one or
more of the standards applicable to trade secret damages. The monetary outcome of
the trial will not so much depend on a theory underlying trade secret protection but
on the plausibility of the parties' arguments.
Prandl, supra note 1, at 456.
6. There has been a fair amount of scholarly commentary in the area of patent damages
analysis. See, e.g., JOHN W. SCHLICHER, PATENT LAW: LEGAL AND ECONOMIC PRINCIPLES
§§ 9.04, 9.05 (2001); Paul M. Janicke, Contemporary Issues in Patent Damages, 42 AM. U. L. REV.
691 (1993); Karen D. McDaniel & Gregory M. Ansems, Damages in the Post-Rite-Hite Era:
Convoyed Sales Illustrate the Dichotomy in Current Damages Law, 78 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK
OFF. SOC'Y 461 (1996); Laura B. Pincus, The Computation of Damages in Patent Infringement
Actions, 5 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 95 (1991). Other commentators have focused on damages in
intellectual property cases more generally. See, e.g., Roger D. Blair & Thomas F. Cotter, An
Economic Analysis of Damages Rules in Intellectual Property Law, 39 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1585
(1998).
7. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
8. See Blair & Cotter, supra note 6, at 1600 ("As Friedman, Landes, and Posner have
noted, trade secret law supplements the patent system by providing limited ownership rights in
information that, although socially valuable, may be insufficiently valuable to merit exclusive
ownership for the twenty-year period mandated by the Patent Act.").
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the standards for determining the reliability of proffered expert testi-
mony under Daubert to exclude fundamentally flawed damage claims.'
The specific patent law principles that may be adopted and ap-
plied to trade secret claims are myriad. For example, the law govern-
ing apportionment and disaggregation of damages is particularly well-
developed in patent cases. Similarly, courts have issued numerous de-
cisions evaluating the existence of acceptable noninfringing alterna-
tives or substitutes and their effect in limiting or completely barring
certain categories of damages. Finally, courts in patent cases have
identified numerous factors that are relevant in valuing intellectual
property. Chief among these are the Georgia-Pacific factors, which are
applied in determining royalty damages. These same principles may
be applied effectively to trade secret damage claims.
Part I of this article discusses the case law acknowledging the ap-
plicability of patent law precedents in the context of trade secret dam-
age claims. Part II discusses the application of patent law precedents
regarding lost profits as a measure of damages. Part III analyzes the
applicability of patent law damages principles in the context of unjust
enrichment as a measure of damages. Part IV then proceeds to exam-
ine how patent law principles are frequently applied in the context of
royalty damages. Part V discusses the case law relating to disaggrega-
tion and apportionment of damages in the context of patent and trade
secret claims. Part VI discusses certain common limitations on dam-
ages based on the relationship between the parties. Part VII analyzes
certain limitations relating to the duration of the damages period. Fi-
nally, Part VIII offers a brief conclusion.
I. THE INTERSECTION OF PATENT AND TRADE SECRET LAW
The number of cases explicitly addressing the intersection be-
tween patent and trade secret damages is surprisingly low. Nonethe-
9. Under the Supreme Court's Daubert and Kumho Tire decisions, trial courts have a "gate-
keeping obligation" to ensure that any and all expert testimony "is not only relevant, but reli-
able." Kumho Tire Co., Ltd. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137,147 (1999); Daubert v. Merrell Dow
Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 589 (1993). This gatekeeping obligation "applies to all expert tes-
timony, not just testimony based in science." FED. R. EVID. 702 advisory committee's notes
("The trial court's gatekeeping function applies to testimony by any expert."); Kumho Tire, 526
U.S. at 141. The principles outlined by the Supreme Court in Daubert have been incorporated
into FRE 702, which states that proffered expert testimony is admissible only if: "(1) the testi-
mony is based upon sufficient facts or data, (2) the testimony is the product of reliable principles
and methods, and (3) the witness has applied the principles and methods reliably to the facts of
the case." FED. R. EVID. 702; see also id. advisory committee's notes ("'[Wlhether the testimony
concerns economic principles, accounting standards, property valuation or other non-scientific
subjects, it should be evaluated by reference to the 'knowledge and experience' of that particular
field."') (quoting American College of Trial Lawyers, Standards and Procedures for Determining
the Admissibility of Expert Testimony After Daubert, 157 F.R.D. 571, 579 (1994)).
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less, certain often-cited cases analyzing trade secret damages do ad-
dress the obvious parallels. The most prominent among these is Uni-
versity Computing Co. v. Lykes- Youngstown Corp.1" In University Com-
puting, the Fifth Circuit broadly stated that "[it seems generally
accepted that 'the proper measure of damages in the case of a trade se-
cret appropriation is to be determined by reference to the analogous
line of cases involving patent infringement, just as patent infringement
cases are used by analogy to determine the damages for copy-right in-
fringement.""'..
The University Computing decision is particularly comprehensive,
addressing various measures of damages for trade secret misappropria-
tion, including lost profits, unjust enrichment and royalty damages.
In support of its assertion that courts should look to patent infringe-
ment cases when evaluating damages claims for trade secret misappro-
priation, the court cited the Third Circuit's decision in International
Industries v. Warren Petroleum Corp.2 In that case, the court applied
patent law principles in evaluating a claim for trade secret damages
based on an unjust enrichment theory. 3 Taken together, University
Computing and International Industries are perhaps the two cases most
frequently cited for the proposition that patent law damages analysis
should be applied in evaluating trade secret damages claims. None-
theless, subsequent decisions have also occasionally recognized that
"trade secrets cases are analogous to patent infringement as concerns
measure of damages."' 4
Patent law precedents provide a wealth of guidance for evaluating
trade secret damages claims. While the Federal Circuit has observed
that the "determination of a damage award is not an exact science,"15
that court and other federal courts have developed a fairly robust body
of precedent and have outlined a variety of clear legal principles that
courts routinely apply in scrutinizing patent damages claims. Appli-
cation of these patent law precedents to trade secret claims may pro-
vide significant guidance in an area of the law that is currently rela-
tively amorphous at best. Nonetheless, despite decisions such as
10. Univ. Computing Co. v. Lykes-Youngstown Corp., 504 F.2d 518 (5th Cir. 1974).
11. Id. at 535 (quoting Int'l Indus., Inc. v. Warren Petroleum Corp., 248 F.2d 696, 699 (3d
Cir. 1957)).
12. Int'l Indus, 248 F.2d 696 (3d Cir. 1957). See also JAGER, supra note 4, § 7.03, at 7-82
("International Industries, Inc. v. Warren Petroleum Corp. is a leading case on trade secret dam-
ages.... The Third Circuit concluded that the proper measure of damages in a trade secret case
is to be determined by reference to the analogous line of cases involving damages for patent in-
fringement.").
13. 248 F.2d at 699.
14. Telex Corp. v. IBM Corp., 510 F.2d 894,930 (10th Cir. 1975).
15. King Instrument Corp. v. Otari Corp., 767 F.2d 853, 863 (Fed. Cir. 1985).
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University Computing and International Industries, courts evaluating
trade secret claims have not relied upon such precedents as frequently
as one might expect.
II. ANALYSIS OF LOST PROFITS DAMAGES
Under the Uniform Trade Secrets Act and other trade secret law,
plaintiffs are permitted to recover damages measured by the plaintiffs
alleged lost profits, the defendant's unjust enrichment, or a reasonable
royalty.16 Plaintiffs may recover both lost profits and unjust enrich-
ment, but only to the extent that these two awards are not duplica-
tive.17 In the alternative, they may receive a reasonable royalty for the
defendant's use of their trade secrets.'
8
The first measure, based on the plaintiffs lost profits, is a com-
mon means of assessing damages in both patent and trade secret cases.
16. See UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 3(a) (1985) (plaintiffs may recover "both the actual
loss caused by misappropriation and the unjust enrichment caused by misappropriation that is
not taken into account in computing actual loss"). For a listing of those states that have adopted
the Uniform Trade Secrets Act and those that instead look to the common law of trade secrets
under the Restatement, see ABA MODEL JURY INSTRUCTIONS § 8.01, at 363-65 (3d ed. 1996).
17. Telex Corp., 510 F.2d at 930 (observing that "a plaintiff may recover either, but not
both [unjust enrichment and lost profits damages], because to allow both would permit double
recovery"); Sperry Rand Corp. v. ATO, Inc., 447 F.2d 1387 (4th Cir. 1971) (same); Jet Spray
Cooler, Inc. v. Crampton, 385 N.E.2d 1349, 1356 (Mass. 1979) ("Of course, a plaintiff is not
entitled to both the profits made by the defendant and his own lost profits."); Rosenhouse, supra
note 2, § 2[a] ("a particular measure of damages [is] inappropriate ... where application would
have resulted in double recovery").
18. Some courts and commentators have concluded that reasonable royalty damages are
particularly appropriate where other damages measures, such as lost profits or unjust enrich-
ment, are difficult to compute. See, e.g., Pioneer Hi-Bred Int'l v. Holden Found. Seeds, Inc., 35
F.3d 1226, 1243 (8th Cir. 1994) (a reasonable royalty "is most appropriate when the other theo-
ries would result in no recovery or when the parties actually had or contemplated a royalty"); Jet
Spray, 385 N.E.2d at 1357 n. 10 ("[T]he 'reasonable royalty' measure of damages is only appro-
priate where the defendant has made no actual profits and the plaintiff is unable to prove a spe-
cific loss."); Johnson, Assessing Damages, supra note 4, at 72 ("An award of a 'reasonable royalty'
is an alternative to other, more traditional measures of damages under the Uniform Trade Secrets
Act. This measure of damages is most often applied where there is difficulty in determining the
plaintiff's actual loss or the defendant's actual gain from the misappropriation."); Prandl, supra
note 1, at 451 ("From a policy standpoint the least attractive method of measuring the plaintiffs
damages is the reasonable royalty standard."). Cf. Pincus, supra note 6, at 119 ("The Federal
Circuit has directed that courts should attempt to determine actual damages-lost profits-prior
to resorting to a royalty award.").
While this approach was taken under the Restatement, it has not been adopted under the Uni-
form Trade Secrets Act:
It is important to keep in mind that unlike the UTSA, the Restatement takes an ei-
ther/or approach to measuring damages-either plaintiffs lost profits, or defendant's
gains. The Restatement treats royalty damages as an alternative to both measures,
available only if neither plaintiff's lost profits nor defendant's gain can be shown. By
contrast, the UTSA allows the plaintiff to choose royalty damages regardless of what
else can be proved.
ABA MODEL JURY INSTRUCTIONS § 8.06[4], at 399 (3d ed. 1996).
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Case law analyzing the parallels between trade secret and patent law
damages in the context of lost profits is fairly sparse. Nonetheless, a
well-developed body of case law in the context of patent law damages
provides a source of legal rules that may be utilized in assessing trade
secret damages claims. Chief among these are the numerous prece-
dents addressing the effects of acceptable alternatives on the plaintiffs
ability to recover lost profits, the threshold for proving lost profits that
are not speculative, and the elements that must be met in proving a
lost profits claim.
A. The Panduit Factors
The cases addressing lost profits in the context of patent in-
fringement recognize the core principle governing lost profits awards
in general-that a plaintiff seeking lost profits must demonstrate "but
for" causation. In the patent infringement context, a plaintiff must
show that "'but for' the infringing activity," it "would have made the
infringer's sales. '"" In order "[t]o show 'but for' causation and enti-
tlement to lost profits," a plaintiff "must reconstruct the market to
show, hypothetically, 'likely outcomes with infringement factored out
of the economic picture. '"'20 Such market reconstruction requires
19. Shockley v. Arcan, Inc., 248 F.3d 1349, 1362 (Fed. Cir. 2001); see also Electro Scientific
Indus., Inc. v. Gen. Scanning Inc., 247 F.3d 1341, 1353 (Fed. Cir. 2001); Grain Processing
Corp. v. Am. Maize-Prods., 185 F.3d 1341, 1349 (Fed. Cir. 1999) ("To recover lost profits, the
patent owner must show 'causation in fact,' establishing that 'but for' the infringement, he would
have made additional profits."); Oiness v. Walgreen Co., 88 F.3d 1025, 1029 (Fed. Cir. 1996)
("To recover lost profits as actual damages, a patent holder must demonstrate that there was a
reasonable probability that, but for the infringement, it would have made the infringer's sales."
(quoting Minn. Mining & Mfg. Co. v. Johnson & Johnson Orthopaedics, Inc., 976 F.2d 1559,
1577 (Fed. Cir. 1992)); Pall Corp. v. Micron Separations, Inc., 66 F.3d 1211, 1222 (Fed. Cir.
1995); Rite-Hite Corp. v. Kelley Co., 56 F.3d 1538, 1545 (Fed. Cir. 1995); Kearns v. Chrysler
Corp., 32 F.3d 1541, 1551 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (affirming summary judgment on issue of lost prof-
its); BIC Leisure Prods., Inc. v. Windsurfing Int'l, Inc., 1 F.3d 1214, 1218 (Fed. Cir. 1993)
("'To recover lost profits as opposed to royalties, a patent owner must prove a causal relation
between the infringement and its loss of profits. The patent owner must show that 'but for' the
infringement, it would have made the infringer's sales."'); SmithKline Diagnostics, Inc. v. He-
lena Labs. Corp., 926 F.2d 1161, 1165 (Fed. Cir. 1991); King Instrument, 767 F.2d at 863 (lost
profits award "requires (1) a showing that the patent owner would have made the sale but for the
infringement, i.e., causation existed, and (2) proper evidence of the computation on lost profits");
SCHLICHER, supra note 6, § 9.04[1][a], at 9-23 ("The patent owner may recover the profits it
would have made on lost sales by showing a reasonable probability that it would have made in-
creased sales but for the infringement."); Pincus, supra note 6, at 102.
The 'but for' analysis is the most difficult element of the Panduit test for the patent
holder to demonstrate .... Lower courts in most recent cases have held that in order
to recover lost profits, the patent holder must prove that 'but for' the infringement, it
would have made the sales of the infringers.
Id.
20. Crystal Semiconductor Corp. v. Tritech Microelectronics, 246 F.3d 1336, 1355 (Fed.
Cir. 2001) (citing Grain Processing, 185 F.3d at 1350).
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"sound economic proof of the nature of the market., 21  Under this
framework, courts "permit patentees to present market reconstruction
theories showing all of the ways in which they would have been better
off in the 'but for world,' and accordingly to recover lost profits in a
wide variety of forms. 22
Courts considering patent infringement claims often apply the
so-called Panduit factors, which outline certain elements that a plain-
tiff must establish to recover lost profits damages. Under the Sixth
Circuit's decision in Panduit, a plaintiff must establish (1) demand for
the infringed product, (2) the absence of non-infringing substitutes,
(3) ability to exploit the demand, and (4) the amount of profit it would
have received absent the alleged infringement. 23  The Federal Circuit
has reiterated that the Panduit test is "an acceptable, though not an
exclusive test for determining 'but for' causation.
24
Under Panduit and its progeny, it is well established that, in or-
der to recover lost profits, a plaintiff must demonstrate the "absence of
non-infringing substitutes. "25 In order to qualify as "acceptable" al-
ternatives, the proffered substitutes or alternatives must be sufficiently
similar and may "not have a disparately higher price or possess char-
acteristics significantly different from the patented product. ' 26  As
21. Grain Processing, 185 F.3d at 1350.
22. Id. (observing that "courts have given patentees significant latitude to prove and re-
cover lost profits for a wide variety of foreseeable economic effects of the infringement").
23. Panduit Corp. v. Stahlin Bros. Fibre Works, 575 F.2d 1152, 1156 (6th Cir. 1978); see
also Pall Corp., 66 F.3d at 1222 ("To establish lost profits by applying the evidentiary guideline
of Panduit the patentee must show (1) that there was a demand for the patented product, (2) the
absence of acceptable noninfringing substitutes, (3) that the patentee was capable of meeting the
demand, and (4) the amount of profits lost."); SmithKline Diagnostics, 926 F.2d at 1165 (citing
Panduit factors); King Instrument, 767 F.2d at 863.
24. BIC Leisure Prods., I F.3d at 1218 (citing State Indus., Inc. v. Mor-Flo Indus., Inc.,
883 F.2d 1573, at 1577 (Fed. Cir. 1989)); see also Kearns, 32 F.3d at 1551 (citing Panduit fac-
tors); Standard Haven Prods., Inc. v. Gencor Indus., Inc., 953 F.2d 1360, 1372 (Fed. Cir. 1992)
("One way to establish causation is the four-part test applied in Panduit .. "); SCHLICHER,
supra note 6, § 9.04[1][a], at 9-23 (observing that although Panduit "is the most frequently ap-
plied test .... [t]he courts say it is not the only test"); Janicke, supra note 6, at 709 ("While Pan-
duit is undoubtedly the most cited analysis for determining a patentee's right to recover lost prof-
its in an infringement suit, it is now well established that Panduit is not the only proper route to
that end."); Pincus, supra note 6, at 100 ("The Sixth Circuit's analysis in Panduit Corp. v. Stahlin
Brothers Fibre Works, Inc., is used by the Federal Circuit and other districts as a guide in 'lost
profit' decisions.").
25. Panduit, 575 F.2d at 1156; see also SmithKline Diagnostics, 926 F.2d at 1165-66 ("'but
for' test is not met" where "others would likely have captured sales made by the infringer"); Jan-
icke, supra note 6, at 701 ("The second prong of Panduit, the absence of acceptable noninfringing
substitutes, has proven the most troublesome prong by far for plaintiffs to prove.").
26. Crystal Semiconductor Corp. v. Tritech Microelectronics, 246 F.3d 1336, 1356 (Fed.
Cir. 2001) ("'[T]he patent owner and the infringer [must] sell products sufficiently similar to
compete against each other in the same market segment."' (quoting BIC Leisure Prods., 1 F.3d at
[Vol. 25:821
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commentators have noted, consideration of acceptable alternatives or
substitutes is necessary "[u]nless the law wishes to systematically
over-reward patented inventions.,
27
In Grain Processing Corp. v. American Maize-Products Co. 21 the
Federal Circuit engaged in an extensive discussion of the rationale be-
hind the prohibition against recovery of lost profits damages where
there are acceptable substitutes. 29 At bottom, this principle flows from
the fundamental requirement that a plaintiff demonstrate "'causation
in fact,' establishing that 'but for' the infringement, he would have
made additional profits."3" As court observed,
[A] fair and accurate reconstruction of the "but for" market...
must take into account, where relevant, alternative actions that
the infringer foreseeably would have undertaken had he not in-
fringed. Without the infringing product, a rational would-be in-
fringer is likely to offer an acceptable noninfringing alternative,
if available, to compete with the patent owner rather than leave
the market altogether.31
Thus, the court held that the availability of acceptable alternative
processes "precluded any lost profits.
32
1218-19) (alteration in original)); Kaufman Co. v. Lantech, Inc., 926 F.2d 1136, 1142 (Fed. Cir.
1991); SmithKline Diagnostics, 926 F.2d at 1166.
If purchasers are motivated to purchase because of particular features of a product
available only from the patent owner and infringers, products without such features
would obviously not be acceptable non-infringing substitutes .... On the other hand,
if the realities of the market are that others would likely have captured sales made by
the infringer, despite a difference in the products, it follows that the 'but for' test is
not met.
Id.; Standard Haven Prods., 953 F.2d at 1373 ("[T]o prove there are no acceptable noninfringing
substitutes, the patent owner must show either that (1) the purchasers in the marketplace gener-
ally were willing to buy the patented product for its advantages, or (2) the specific purchasers of
the infringing product purchased on that basis."); Panduit, 575 F.2d at 1162 ("A product lacking
the advantages of that patented can hardly be termed a substitute 'acceptable' to the customer
who wants those advantages.").
27. SCHLICHER, supra note 6, § 9.05[2][1], at 9-95. As Schlicher observes:
Grain Processing means that, for purposes of determining lost profits, the market value
of any patent invention is the difference between the profits that would be made by a
patent owner from use of that invention in the manner determined by the patent
owner in the absence of any infringement, and the profits that would be made by the
patent owner if others (including the infringer) used the next most valuable available
substitute technology that would not infringe any patents of that patent owner.
Id. § 9.0512][o, at 9-112.
28. Grain Processing Corp. v. Am. Maize-Prods. Co., 185 F.3d 1341 (Fed. Cir. 1999).
29. Id. at 1349-56.
30. Id. at 1349; id. at 1351 ("The competitor in the 'but for' marketplace is hardly likely to
surrender its complete market share when faced with a patent, if it can compete with it in some
lawful manner.").
31. Id. at 1350-51.
32. Id. at 1356.
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Indeed, in Grain Processing, the court went beyond prior prece-
dent in holding that even "an available technology not on the market
during the infringement can constitute a noninfringing alternative"
that mandated a "denial of lost profits."33 However, where alternative
processes were actually being used to supply product to the market
throughout the damages period, the court observed that "market sales
of an acceptable noninfringing substitute often suffice alone to defeat a
case for lost profits."34
The court emphasized that it was critical that acceptable alterna-
tives be compared to determine whether the intellectual property at
issue had any economic value and, moreover, indicated that alterna-
tives that were not perfect substitutes could be used to obtain an esti-
mate of damages through comparison with the infringed technology:
[O]nly by comparing the patented invention to its next-best
available alternative(s)-regardless of whether the alternative(s)
were actually produced and sold during the infringement-can
the court discern the market value of the patent owner's exclu-
sive right, and therefore his expected profit or reward, had the
infringer's activities not prevented him from taking full eco-
nomic advantage of this right.3"
Thus, as the court observed, "an accurate reconstruction of the hypo-
thetical 'but for' market takes into account any alternatives available to
the infringer.
36
The court's recognition that the existence of acceptable alterna-
tives barred recovery of lost profits did not automatically preclude re-
covery of damages entirely. Rather, the district court ruled that the
plaintiff was still entitled to a royalty because the next-best alternative
process, while equivalent in terms of customer demand, was slightly
higher in cost. Accordingly, the court awarded a royalty based on the
33. Id. at 1351.
34. Id. at 1352 ("Several opinions of this court have noted that 'market sales' provide sig-
nificant evidence of availability as a substitute."). Similarly, products produced by a third-party
licensee of the patentee can also be acceptable non-infringing substitutes. See, e.g., Aptargroup,
Inc. v. Summit Packaging Sys., Inc., 1996 WL 114781, at *5 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 14, 1996) ("Devices
produced by a third party licensee of the patentee, such as those produced by Cap & Seal, are
considered to be acceptable non-infringing substitutes."), affd, 178 F.3d 1306 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
35. Grain Processing, 185 F.3d at 1351 (citing Westinghouse Elec. & Mfg. Co. v. Wagner
Elec. & Mfg. Co., 225 U.S. 604, 614-15 (1912)); Mowry v. Whitney, 81 U.S. (14 Wall.) 620,
651 (1871); King Instrument Corp. v. Otari Corp., 767 F.2d 853, 865 (Fed. Cir. 1985).
36. Grain Processing, 185 F.3d at 1351, 1356 ("In summary, this court requires reliable
economic proof of the market that establishes an accurate context to project the likely results 'but
for' the infringement. The availability of substitutes invariably will influence the market forces
defining this 'but for' marketplace, as it did in this case.").
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cost savings attributable to the plaintiffs patent.37 Presumably, were
there no cost savings attributable to the plaintiffs patent, the royalty,
and therefore the plaintiffs damages, would have been zero.3"
Indeed, long-established Supreme Court precedent suggests just
such a result. In Black v. Thorne, the Court indicated that only
"nominal" damages could be recovered where other, nonpatented
methods produced the same results in terms of costs and advantages:
It does not always follow that because a party may have made an
improvement in a machine and obtained a patent for it, another
using the improvement and infringing upon the patentee's rights
will be mulcted in more than nominal damages for the infringe-
ment. If other methods in common use produce the same re-
sults, with equal facility and cost, the use of the patented inven-
tion cannot add to the gains of the infringer, or impair the just
rewards of the inventor. The inventor may indeed prohibit the
use, or exact a license fee for it, and if such license fee has been
generally paid, its amount may be taken as the criterion of dam-
age to him when his rights are infringed. In the absence of such
criterion, the damages must necessarily be nominal.39
Thus, the existence of alternatives can drive a plaintiffs damages to
zero. Consequently, the analysis of alternatives or substitutes consti-
tutes a powerful limitation on the plaintiffs ability to recover dam-
ages.
Another element under Panduit that often has significant practi-
cal effect is the requirement that a plaintiff prove that it had the
manufacturing and marketing capacity necessary to meet the demand
for the product incorporating the patented technology in the "but for"
world. For example, in Kearns v. Chrysler Corp., the Federal Circuit
upheld the district court's ruling denying lost profits on the grounds
that the plaintiff had failed to prove that it "possessed the capability to
manufacture and market" the infringed product.4" Indeed, the plain-
tiff in that case had not even shown that it had ever made any sales of
the infringed product in the past.41 Thus, the court concluded that
37. Id. at 1347 (describing royalty based on "the cost difference between Processes 1-111
and Process IV, while also taking into account possible cost fluctuations (due to fluctuating en-
zyme prices) and the elimination of American Maize's risk of producing an infringing product,
despite its best efforts").
38. See Pincus, supra note 6, at 131 ("the infringer may show that there are completely ac-
ceptable alternatives the use of which would have precluded any payment of a royalty").
39. Black v. Thorne, 111 U.S. 122, 124 (1884).
40. Kearns v. Chrysler Corp., 32 F.3d 1541, 1551 (Fed. Cir. 1994).
41. Id.
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there was "no alternative but to have damages determined on the basis
of a reasonable royalty.
4 2
Surprisingly, there appear to be few cases analyzing lost profits
claims for trade secret misappropriation in such detail. Courts some-
times recognize the general principle applicable to all lost profits
claims, whether in the context of intellectual property cases or not,
that a plaintiff must demonstrate "but for" causation, observing that
the plaintiffs "actual loss would be the profit it would have made on
the product it would have sold but for the defendants' misappropria-
tion."43 Thus, there is at least some recognition of the fundamental
principle underlying the Panduit factors. Nonetheless, there is a
dearth of published decisions applying such factors in the context of
trade secret misappropriation claims.
One exception appears to be the Eighth Circuit's decision in Pio-
neer Hi-Bred International v. Holden Foundation Seeds, Inc." In Pio-
neer, the court upheld the district court's application of a "but for"
analysis that "considered each of the factual concerns discussed in
Panduit," including "(1) demand for product, (2) no non-infringing
substitutes, (3) ability to exploit the demand, and (4) amount of profit
it would receive."4  Citing patent precedents such as King Instru-
46ment, the court observed that such a "'but for' rationale... appears
to be a straightforward and not uncommon approach to determining
lost profits. '47 Accordingly, the court made no distinction between
the patent and trade secret contexts.
Other courts have cited certain of the Panduit factors (without
specifically referencing the case) in rejecting proffered lost profit opin-
ions. In KW Plastics v. United States Can Co., for example, the court
rejected an expert's opinion as to lost profits under Daubert where the
expert failed to demonstrate that the plaintiff had the capacity to make
the sales it claims it would have made absent the alleged
misappropriation, thereby applying the third Panduit factor.4' The
42. Id. In describing this aspect of the Panduit test one commentator has observed:
The third prong of Panduit's four-prong proof pattern for lost profits recovery, the
patentee's ability to meet the demand for his or her patented product, is and remains a
requirement for lost profits to be recovered. The patentee's "ability to meet demand"
is understood, however, not as requiring the patent owner to have immediate plant
capacity. Rather, patentees may satisfy this prong by showing that they could have
subcontracted the production work or that their facilities were adequate or could have
been made adequate to meet demand for the patented product.
Janicke, supra note 6, at 706.
43. Mangren Research & Dev. Corp. v. Nat'l Chem. Co., 87 F.3d 937, 945 (7th Cir. 1996);
see also Pioneer Hi-Bred Int'l v. Holden Found. Seeds, Inc., 35 F.3d 1226, 1245 (8th Cir. 1994).
44. 35 F.3d 1226 (8th Cir. 1994).
45. Id. at 1245 & n.56.
46. King Instrument Corp. v. Otari Corp., 767 F.2d 853 (Fed. Cir. 1985).
47. Pioneer Hi-Bred lnt'l, 35 F.3d at 1245.
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priation, thereby applying the third Panduit factor." The court barred
the expert's lost profits testimony on the grounds that the expert
"[i]mplicitly acknowledg[ed] that his 'guess' about [the plaintiffs] ac-
tual capacity was erroneous."49 Moreover, the court noted that the ex-
pert's conclusions regarding capacity were based upon "insufficient
facts and data," and that "the cumulative effect of [the] methodologi-
cal errors render[ed] the lost profits calculation speculative, without
foundation, and with an unknown error rate."50 Thus, while not ex-
pressly acknowledging Panduit, the court recognized the requirement
that a plaintiff demonstrate sufficient capacity as a critical element of
any lost profits claim.
Despite the lack of reliance by courts addressing lost profits
claims in the context of trade secret misappropriation cases upon the
numerous patent infringement precedents, there are many reasons
supporting application of this well-developed body of case law in the
context of trade secret damages. First, the award of lost profits in the
context of trade secret misappropriation is completely analogous to re-
covery of lost profits for patent infringement, given that patents and
trade secrets merely represent two species of intellectual property.
There is no principled distinction between the two cases.
Second, the parallels are evidenced by those trade secret cases
that recognize that in order to recover lost profits a plaintiff must es-
tablish "but for" causation. All of the Panduit factors essentially flow
from this requirement. In order to establish that it would have made
certain profits absent the alleged infringement or misappropriation, a
plaintiff must demonstrate that there would have been demand for its
product in a "but for" world. A related requirement is that in the "but
for" world there is an absence of acceptable substitutes a would-be in-
fringer or misappropriator could use as an alternative to utilizing the
plaintiffs technology. The third requirement under Panduit is related
to the first two: in order to recover lost profits, a plaintiff must show
that it had the ability to exploit the demonstrated demand in the "but
for" world by showing, for example, that it had sufficient capacity to
make any alleged lost sales. The final element under Panduit merely
requires that a plaintiff be able to establish the amount of any alleged
profits that it would have made in the "but for" world absent the al-
leged misappropriation or infringement with reasonable certainty.
Thus, each of the Panduit factors merely elaborates upon the more
fundamental requirement that a plaintiff demonstrate "but for" causa-
48. KW Plastics v. U.S. Can Co., 131 F. Supp. 2d 1289, 1292 (M.D. Ala. 2001).
49. Id.
50. Id. at 1293.
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tion of its damages, which has been recognized as being equally appli-
cable to trade secret misappropriation claims.
Application of the Panduit factors in trade secret cases can pro-
vide a rational framework for judicial scrutiny of plaintiffs' alleged
damages that is likely to have the salient effect of preventing weak or
unsupported damages claims from reaching the jury. More specifi-
cally, application of Grain Processing and other cases addressing ac-
ceptable alternatives or substitutes is likely to be particularly benefi-
cial. Where there are readily available alternatives to the plaintiffs
alleged trade secrets, a plaintiff should not be allowed to recover lost
profits as a measure of trade secret damages. Rather, as in Grain Proc-
essing, the plaintiff should be limited to reasonable royalty (or some
limited measure of unjust enrichment) damages.
In Grain Processing, the plaintiff was able to demonstrate that be-
cause of cost savings that were associated with the defendant's use of
the patented technology, a reasonable royalty may have been appro-
priate."' However, where there is no such cost savings or other basis
for awarding a non-zero royalty, a trade secret plaintiff should be
barred from recovering damages at all. Under such circumstances, the
existence of readily available, equivalent alternatives dictates that the
plaintiff should not be able to recover damages given that it has suf-
fered no real injury and the defendant has received no real benefit.
B. Reliable Economic Analysis and Reconstruction of the Market
Another corollary of the "but for" causation requirement for lost
profits is the principle that plaintiffs may not recover lost profits dam-
ages that are in some way speculative or which depend upon untenable
assumptions. 2 In the context of patent infringement claims, a number
of courts have readily barred lost profits claims that are based on un-
51. Grain Processing Corp. v. Am. Maize-Prods., 185 F.3d 1341, 1347-48 (Fed. Cir.
1999).
52. See DSC Communications Corp. v. Next Level Communications, 107 F.3d 322, 329
(5th Cir. 1997) (in trade secret cases, "[w]e examine the challenge that damages for lost profits
are speculative to determine whether a reasonable person could find the profits were established
with reasonable certainty, considering all evidence in the light most favorable to the plaintiffs");
Michel Cosmetics, Inc. v. Tsirkas, 26 N.E.2d 16 (N.Y. 1940).
[I]f the plaintiff would otherwise have made the sales of lipsticks which in fact the de-
fendants made by the use of plaintiffs formulas, then the plaintiff is entitled to re-
cover from the defendants the amount of the profits which the plaintiff would have
acquired upon such sales but for the defendants' wrong.
Id. at 17-18; JAGER, supra note 4, § 7.03, at 7-79 ("The damages cannot be purely speculative,




supported constant volume or profit assumptions.5 3 While plaintiffs
often attempt to "assume" a certain level of profit or sales, courts re-
viewing patent infringement claims have required something more: a
reliable economic analysis and reconstruction of the market in the "but
for" world.
For example, in Oiness v. Walgreen Co., the Federal Circuit re-
jected an extrapolated lost profit calculation where the expert's analy-
sis relied on unsupported assumptions that were "fraught with specu-
lation."54  The court concluded that the expert "offered no sound
economic reasoning to support his assumption" and that his "projec-
tions lacked evidentiary support."" Consequently, the court over-
turned the jury's lost profits award because the expert's analysis "in-
vite[d] the jury to engage in rapt speculation." 6  At bottom, the
plaintiffs lost profits claim was deemed insufficient because it was not
based on "actual sales combined with reliable economic analysis of
demand, supply, and price over time.""
Similarly, in Shockley v. Arcan, Inc., the Federal Circuit rejected
a lost profits analysis that "assume[d] continued . . . profit margins."58
The plaintiffs damage expert assumed that the plaintiff would sell
80,000 units per year, a number that was "without factual underpin-
nings," but rather was based on the plaintiff s representation concern-
ing sales "it would have made."59 Relying upon prior decisions such
as Oiness, the court concluded that this analysis was flawed given that
the expert had based his calculation on "a benchmark without any ba-
sis in economic reality."6 Thus, the court ruled that plaintiffs could
not prevail on a lost profits claim that merely "assumes continued de-
mand and growth rates, profit margins and other market factors
against the clear weight of the evidence."61
Such rigorous scrutiny of the assumptions underlying plaintiffs'
lost profits analyses in the context of trade secret misappropriation
similarly would be appropriate. Again, the principles applied in cases
such as Shockley and Oiness flow from the more fundamental require-
53. Courts have similarly rejected lost profits claims for copyright infringement where
there is an "absence of convincing evidence as to the volume of sales that plaintiff would have
obtained." Hamil Am., Inc. v. GFI, 193 F.3d 92, 108 (2d Cir. 1999) (lost profits "too specula-
tive").
54. Oiness v. Walgreen Co., 88 F.3d 1025, 1029-30 (Fed. Cir. 1996).
55. Id. at 1032.
56. Id. at 1029.
57. Id.
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ment that a plaintiff must demonstrate "but for" causation in order to
recover lost profits. Where a plaintiff merely assumes that it would
make certain sales or profits absent the alleged infringement or misap-
propriation rather than providing both a factual foundation and reli-
able economic analysis to support its claims, its attempt to recover lost
profits must fail.
III. ANALYSIS OF UNJUST ENRICHMENT DAMAGES
Patent law precedents may similarly provide guidance in evaluat-
ing claims in trade secret cases for damages based on alleged unjust
enrichment. On its face, modern patent law may appear inapplicable
in determining unjust enrichment awards. Under the patent statutes,
plaintiffs may recover only lost profits or royalty damages for in-
fringement of their patents.62 In contrast, trade secret plaintiffs may
attempt to measure their damages not only based on alleged lost prof-
its or a reasonable royalty, but also by the benefit or unjust enrichment
received by the defendant as a result of the alleged misappropriation.63
Thus, trade secret law provides for a remedy that, on its face, appears
to be absent under the patent statutes.
Nonetheless, at one time plaintiffs in patent infringement cases
were permitted to recover damages based on the benefit received by
the defendant as a result of the alleged infringement. Indeed, this was
the case from at least 1870 to 1946, when the patent statutes were
amended.64 Therefore, cases decided before this change in the law
62. The patent statutes provide for lost profits and reasonable royalty damages: "Upon
finding for claimant the court shall award the claimant damages adequate to compensate for the
infringement but in no event less than a reasonable royalty for the use made of the invention by
the infringer, together with interest and costs as fixed by the court." 35 U.S.C. § 284; see also
Blair & Cotter, supra note 6, at 1595-96 (observing that "courts have interpreted [Section 284] as
preventing them from awarding the plaintiff a restitutionary recovery consisting of the defen-
dant's profits attributable to the infringement").
63. See, e.g., UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 3(a) (1985). The court in University Comput-
ing indicated that the unjust enrichment measure "is usually the accepted approach where the
secret has not been destroyed and where the plaintiff is unable to prove specific injury." Univ.
Computing v. Lykes-Youngstown Corp., 504 F.2d 518, 518 (5th Cir. 1974).
64. See SCHLICHER, supra note 6, § 9.04[2][a], at 9-24.10 ("From at least 1870 to 1946, a
patent owner could recover by an action in equity the infringer's gains or profits, and any dam-
ages the patent owner sustained in excess of those gains or profits .... The owner could also re-
cover in an action in equity the infringer's profits attributable to the infringement as determined
in an accounting before a master, and the owner's lost profits.").
As Schlicher observes in his treatise, "in 1964 the Supreme Court declared that the infringer's
profits could never be the measure of damages" for patent infringement and that the "infringer's
profits as a measure of damages was eliminated in 1946." Id. 9.04[2][b], at 9-31. Ironically as
Schlicher notes, Congress made the change in the patent statute because it "wished to eliminate
the problems created by the need to apportion the part of profits that would be attributable to an
invention from those attributable to other factors." Id.; see also Ellipse Corp. v. Ford Motor Co.,
461 F. Supp. 1354, 1380 (N.D. Ill. 1978) ("Congress amended the patent statute in 1946 to
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may provide guidance. Moreover, even now, a number of commenta-
tors have observed that courts often use a royalty to measure the
"benefit" received by the defendant as a result of the alleged infringe-
ment, thereby making the royalty award nothing more than a proxy
for the defendant's unjust enrichment.65
Some early trade secret cases expressly rely upon this patent law
precedent as authority in analyzing trade secret damages measured by
the defendant's alleged unjust enrichment. For example, in Interna-
tional Industries, the Third Circuit cited patent law precedent in ana-
lyzing the benefit to the defendant from cost savings it received as a
result of the alleged misappropriation under the "standard of compari-
son" method.66 The court described the analysis as follows:
The advantage enjoyed by defendant is to be measured by the
standard of comparison method. This method contemplates a
comparison of the cost of transportation by means of the use of
the trade secret with a method of accomplishing the same result
which would have been open to defendant had he not appropri-
ated the trade secret.
67
eliminate the recovery of profits precisely because of the impossibility of apportioning profits to a
piece or a part of a larger entity."), affd, 614 F.2d 775 (7th Cir. 1979). However, as Schlicher
observes and as is clear from the discussion of apportionment below, "[t]he apportionment prob-
lem did not go away after 1946." SCHLICHER, supra note 6, § 9.04[2][b], at 9-31. Rather, plain-
tiffs must still properly apportion damages under the remaining lost profits and royalty meas-
ures.
65. See, e.g., Blair & Cotter, supra note 6, at 1650 ("The good news is that the formal pro-
hibition on restitutionary awards may have little impact upon the courts' actual behavior. Al-
though it is usually considered erroneous to award the prevailing plaintiff 100% of the profit at-
tributable to the infringement, commentators sometimes accuse courts of doing so nonetheless
sub silentio." (citing Ned L. Conley, An Economic Approach to Patent Damages, 15 AIPLA QJ.
354 (1987)); cf. SCHLICHER, supra note 6, § 9.04[6], at 9-55.
When the Supreme Court declared that an infringer's profits was not a proper meas-
ure of damages, patent owners unable to prove their lost profits were forced to prove
them under the royalty theory. The problem was that it is, in many cases, impossible
to apply the royalty theory without considering the infringer's profits.
Id.
66. Int'l Indus. v. Warren Petroleum Corp., 248 F.2d 696, 699 (3d Cir. 1957).
67. Id.; see also Telex Corp. v. IBM Corp., 510 F.2d 894 (10th Cir. 1975).
[T]he so-called "standard of comparison" test.., contemplates a comparison of the
costs incurred by the defendant using the stolen trade secret, and the costs that would
have been incurred had he not used the trade secret. The difference between the two
is the "benefit" accruing to the defendant, and is the measure of plaintiffs damages.
Id. at 930. As one commentator has observed, in International Industries,
[t]he court held that the advantage gained by a trade secret misappropriator... is to
be measured by a "standard of comparison" method. Under this test, the cost to the
defendant of using the trade secret is compared to the cost of "accomplishing the same
result" by other means open to the defendant at the time of the misappropriation.
JAGER, supra note 4, § 7.03, at 7-82.
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The court observed that the standard of comparison method is par-
ticularly appropriate where a defendant is alleged to have misappro-
priated trade secrets relating to a process rather than a product.68
The Restatement (Third) of Unfair Competition summarizes the
law governing the standard of comparison method.69 The Restatement
indicates that this method may be the preferred method for calculating
damages where the benefit to the defendant consists primarily in cost
savings realized through misappropriation:
If the benefit derived by the defendant consists primarily of cost
savings, such as when the trade secret is a more efficient method
of product, the "standard of comparison" measure that deter-
mines relief based on the savings achieved through the use of the
trade secret may be the most appropriate measure of relief. The
standard of comparison measure determines the defendant's gain
by comparing the defendant's actual costs with the costs that the
defendant would have incurred to achieve the same result with-
out the use of the appropriated trade secret.7°
As the Restatement discussion observes, and as is reflected in the cases
that have addressed the issue, 71 the "cost savings" received by the de-
fendant will often be development costs that are avoided through mis-
appropriating another party's alleged trade secrets:
68. Int'l Indus., 248 F.2d at 702 ("Where the thing appropriated or infringed is a process
rather than a manufactured article, the profits are simply measured by the savings determined by
the standard of comparison computation."). Commentators have also noted that the standard of
comparison method may be a particularly appropriate method for measuring damages where the
alleged trade secrets relate to a process:
The third method of measuring damages derives from patent cases and uses a "stan-
dard of comparison" method to assess the savings to the defendant resulting from the
use of the trade secret. This approach is most appropriate in cases where the savings
to the defendant are the major benefit of the misappropriation. One typical situation
where this condition arises is where the trade secret resulted in a more efficient pro-
duction process for the defendant.
JAGER, supra note 4, at § 3.03[6][b][i], at 3-61.
69. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 45 cmt. f (modified) (1995).
70. Id. § 45 cmt. d.
71. See, e.g., Salsbury Labs., Inc. v. Merieux Labs., Inc., 908 F.2d 706, 714 (11th Cir.
1990) (in awarding trade secret misappropriation damages, "court arrived at an amount that
fairly reflects only the savings inuring to [the defendant]"); Telex Corp., 510 F.2d at 930 (award-
ing savings in development costs); Servo Corp. v. Gen. Elec. Co., 393 F.2d 551 (4th Cir. 1968);
see also Prandl, supra note 1, at 451 (observing that "courts have awarded damages for the defen-
dant's savings resulting from reduced research and development costs"); Univ. Computing v.
Lykes-Youngstown Corp., 504 F.2d 518, 538 (5th Cir. 1974) (observing that the standard of
comparison method "[o]cassionally... has been taken to mean the difference in costs to the de-
fendant of developing the trade secret on his own, using the actual development costs of the
plaintiff as the complete measure of damages").
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When it would have been possible for the defendant to acquire
the trade secret by proper means such as reverse engineering or
independent development, the appropriate comparison may be
between the costs of such acquisition and the cost of using the
appropriated information. In determining the costs of proper
acquisition, the court may consider the actual development costs
of the plaintiff and, if available, the development or reverse en-
gineering costs of third persons.7
However, the Restatement also observes that cost savings may be
calculated by comparing the costs of the infringed technology and the
costs of acceptable alternatives as follows: "When acquisition of the
trade secret by proper means is unlikely, the appropriate comparison
may be between the costs of using the trade secret and the costs of al-
ternative methods available to the defendant to achieve the same re-
sult."73 In describing all of these various permutations of the standard
of comparison method, the Restatement expressly acknowledges that
"the 'standard of comparison' measure ... is derived from patent in-
fringement cases and measures the savings to the defendant that are
attributable to the use of the trade secret."74 Thus, this approach to
measuring unjust enrichment is expressly acknowledged to have its
origins in patent law precedents.7"
72. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 45 cmt. d (1995).
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. Despite the numerous decisions basing unjust enrichment awards on some measure of
cost savings, some commentators have read the Fifth Circuit's decision in University Computing
as evidencing some doubt about using this approach to measuring damages under certain cir-
cumstances. See, e.g., Prandl, supra note 1, at 451 ("[M]any courts have refused to award the
defendant's savings. University Computing Co. v. Lykes Youngstown Corp. held that the standard
of comparison test is frequently inadequate because it fails to take into account the commercial
setting in which the misappropriation took place.").
The University Computing court's comments, however, were directed at using development
costs as a particular measure of damages (and not necessarily the standard of comparison meas-
ure more generally). Moreover, the court indicated that there were particular circumstances
where development costs would be an appropriate remedy:
In certain cases, where the trade secret was used by the defendant in a limited number
of situations, where the plaintiff was not in direct competition with the defendant,
where the development of the secret did not require substantial improvements in ex-
isting trade practices but rather merely refined the existing practices, and where the
defendant's use of the plaintiff's trade secret was ceased, such a limited measure might
be appropriate. In the type of case which we now consider, when the parties were po-
tentially in direct competition and the course of conduct of the defendant extended
over a period of time and included a number of different uses of the plaintiffs trade
secret, and where the process of developing a computer system was very difficult and
required substantial technical and theoretical advances, we believe a broader measure
of damages is needed.
504 F.2d at 538.
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Another common measure of unjust enrichment damages is
based on the defendant's profits.76 However, in order to utilize this
measure of purported damages, the plaintiff must provide reliable
proof of the defendant's profits-they cannot be speculative." Ac-
cordingly, as stated by the court in University Computing, "[n]ormally
only the defendant's actual profits can be used as a measure of dam-
ages in cases where profits can be proved, and the defendant is nor-
mally not assessed damages on wholly speculative expectations of
profits."7 "
Here, again, patent law precedents are instructive. In particular,
as catalogued below, there are numerous decisions in the patent con-
text addressing the proper apportionment of damages based on the de-
fendant's profits. Similarly, the numerous decisions regarding alterna-
tives and substitutes that courts have rendered in the context of patent
infringement claims may also be applicable in trade secret cases. As
noted above, the Restatement suggests that alternatives are properly
considered in determining unjust enrichment damages for trade secret
misappropriation. Recent decisions seem to adopt this approach not
only in determining the cost savings associated with an alleged trade
secret, but also in determining whether the plaintiff may recover some
portion of the defendant's profits, given that the existence of accept-
able alternatives arguably diminishes (or even eliminates) the "bene-
fit" to the defendant resulting from the alleged misappropriation.
The Federal Circuit's decision in C&F Packing Co. v. IBP, Inc.,
for example, may be read as tacitly approving this approach.79 C&F
Packing involved alleged misappropriation of purported trade secrets
relating to a process for making precooked Italian sausage pizza top-
ping." The plaintiff, C&F, had obtained a patent that disclosed its
Finally, the court also observed that even where some "broader measure" of damages would
be more appropriate, development costs should still be considered:
This broader measure should take into consideration development costs, but as only
one of a number of different factors. We believe this type of measure is appropriate
despite the fact that the inclusion of other factors means the final damage figure "need
not be as precise as if the actual development costs for the trade secret were itself the
measure of damages."
Id. (quoting Forest Labs., Inc. v. Pillsbury Co., 452 F.2d 621, 628 (7th Cir. 1971)).
76. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 45 cmt. c (1995) ("In some
situations the defendant's enrichment is represented by profits from sales made possible by the
appropriation; in others, by savings achieved through the use of the trade secret in the defen-
dant's business.").
77. Univ. Computing, 504 F.2d at 536.
78. Id.
79. C&F Packing Co. v. IBP, Inc., 224 F.3d 1296, 1304 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
80. Id. at 1302.
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process which was subsequently invalidated.8 Nonetheless, C&F also
claimed that it later developed certain trade secrets relating to that
process.82
In attacking C&F's damages evidence, the defendant argued that
it "'could have used' the process publicly disclosed in C&F's '094 pat-
ent, instead of the secret process, to make its product."a However, on
appeal, the Federal Circuit concluded that "the record does not show
that [the defendant] was able to, and did, produce precooked sausage
topping of the quality required by its customer without use of C&F's
trade secrets. ' 84 Thus, the court did not appear to question the rele-
vance of alternative processes (such as C&F's patented process) in de-
termining whether the plaintiff could recover unjust enrichment dam-
ages. Rather, the court merely concluded that the evidence did not
sufficiently establish the existence of such alternatives.
IV. ANALYSIS OF ROYALTY DAMAGES
Perhaps, the area in which courts have most fully applied patent
law damages principles to trade secret damages claims is in the area of
royalty damages.8" Under both patent and trade secret law, plaintiffs
may recover a "reasonable royalty" that "attempts to measure a hypo-
thetically agreed value of what the defendant wrongfully obtained
from the plaintiff. By means of a 'suppositious meeting' between the
parties, the court calculates what the parties would have agreed to as a
fair licensing price at the time that the misappropriation occurred."86
The seminal case applying patent law royalty principles in the
context of trade secret misappropriation claims is the Fifth Circuit's
decision in University Computing. In analyzing the royalty award, the
court applied the Georgia-Pacific factors that had been developed in
the context of patent infringement claims,87 adapting those factors to
81. Id. at 1299-1300.
82. Id. at 1299.
83. Id. at 1304.
84. Id.
85. "A reasonable royalty is a particularly useful measure of damages if the trade secret
owner derives a certain royalty for its use of the trade secret. Under those circumstances, the
same royalty should be used against the defendant who misappropriates the trade secret."
JAGER, supra note 4, at 7-92 (citing Kamin v. Kuhnau, 374 P.2d 912 (1962)).
86. Vt. Microsystems, Inc. v. Autodesk, Inc., 88 F.3d 142, 151 (2d Cir. 1996) (citing Ga.-
Pac. Corp. v. U.S. Plywood-Champion Papers Inc., 446 F.2d 295, 296-97 (2d Cir. 1971)); see
also Pincus, supra note 6, at 121-22 (discussing "'hypothetical license' approach" to computing
royalty for patent infringement).
87. As one commentator has noted, "[tihe most widely accepted list of facts pertinent to the
determination of a reasonable royalty is the list compiled by the United States District Court for
the Southern District of New York in Georgia Pacific v. United States Plywood Corp."
SCHLICHER, supra note 6, § 9.04[3], at 9-34 (listing the Georgia-Pacific factors).
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the trade secret claims before it. The court summarized the relevant
factors as follows:
In calculating what a fair licensing price would have been had
the parties agreed, the trier of fact should consider such factors
as the resulting and foreseeable changes in the parties' competi-
tive posture; the prices past purchasers or licensees may have
paid; the total value of the secret to the plaintiff, including the
plaintiffs development costs and the importance of the secret to
the plaintiffs business; the nature and extent of the use the de-
fendant intended for the secret; and finally whatever other
unique factors in the particular case which might have affected
the parties' agreement, such as the ready availability of alterna-
tive processes."8
While the court cited Georgia-Pacific as the source of these fac-
tors, it did not cite each of the factors identified in that case. For ex-
ample, the Georgia-Pacific court identified certain additional factors
such as the portion of the realizable profit that should be credited to
the invention as distinguished from non-patented elements or signifi-
cant features or improvements added by the infringer. 9 Nonetheless,
there is no indication that the court in University Computing believed
that such factors were inapplicable in the context of trade secret
claims, and indeed there is no principled reason to exclude them from
such an analysis. Rather, the court's failure to list each and every one
of the fifteen Georgia-Pacific factors more likely stems from the
lengthy (and duplicative) nature of that list rather than any conclusion
regarding the applicability of the factors the court did not cite.
For example, the fact-finder in the context of a trade secret case
could consider as a factor in determining a reasonable royalty the ele-
ments of a particular process or machine that did not utilize the al-
leged trade secrets-one of the Georgia-Pacific factors not expressly
enumerated in University Computing-and exclude any value attribut-
able to such elements. Thus, certain of the enumerated Georgia-
88. Univ. Computing v. Lykes-Youngstown Corp., 504 F.2d 518, 539 (5th Cir. 1974) (cit-
ing Hughes Tool Co. v. G.W. Murphy Indus., Inc., 491 F.2d 923, 931 (5th Cir. 1973)). Com-
mentators frequently cite the University Computing factors in discussing the proper determination
of reasonable royalties. See, e.g., Johnson, Assessing Damages, supra note 4, at 72.
89. Ga.-Pac. Corp. v. U.S. Plywood Corp., 318 F. Supp. 1116, 1120 (S.D.N.Y. 1970),
modified, 446 F.2d 295 (2d Cir. 1971). The Georgia-Pacific court, observing that "[a] compre-
hensive list of evidentiary factors relevant, in general, to the determination of the amount of a
reasonable royalty for a patent license may be drawn from a conspectus of the leading cases,"
proceeded to identify fifteen of the "more pertinent" factors to be considered. Id. However, the
court also noted that "there is no formula by which these factors can be rated precisely in the or-
der of their relative importance or by which their economic significance can be automatically
transduced into their pecuniary equivalent." Id. at 1120-21.
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Pacific factors are clearly applicable to trade secret claims. This is not
to say, however, that certain aspects of these factors may be applied
without modification. For example, one factor identified by the Geor-
gia-Pacific court is "[t]he duration of the patent and the term of the
license."90 While the term of any relevant license regarding alleged
trade secrets may be directly applicable, the "duration of the patent" is
not. Nonetheless, the general idea concerning the longevity of the in-
tellectual property at issue may be applied by looking to the ease with
which others in the marketplace may be able to obtain the alleged
trade secrets through reverse engineering or the time at which alleged
trade secrets may have been made public through publication in a pat-
ent, for example. Thus, the general durational notion found within
this Georgia-Pacific factor can be modified for application in the con-
text of trade secret claims.
Indeed, other courts that have followed University Computing
have applied certain additional factors found in Georgia-Pacific when
evaluating reasonable royalty claims. For example, the Second Circuit
in Vermont Microsystems, Inc. v. Autodesk, Inc. followed the University
Computing analysis of royalty damages, but added an additional factor
present in the much more comprehensive Georgia-Pacific listing. Spe-
cifically, the court noted the following:
If the trade secret accounts for only a portion of the profits
earned on the defendant's sales, such as when the trade secret re-
lates to a single component of a product marketable without the
secret, an award to the plaintiff of defendant's entire profit may
be unjust. The royalty that the plaintiff and defendant would
have agreed to for the use of the trade secret made by the defen-
dant may be one measure of the approximate portion of the de-
fendant's profits attributable to the use.9'
90. Id. at 1120.
91. Vt. Microsystems, 138 F.3d at 450. The Vermont Microsystems court also recited the
factors identified by the court in University Computing:
To approximate the parties' agreement, had they bargained in good faith at the time
of the misappropriation,
the trier of fact should consider such factors as the resulting and foreseeable
changes in the parties' competitive posture; the prices past purchasers or licen-
sees may have paid; the total value of the secret to the plaintiff, including the
plaintiff's development costs and the importance of the secret to the plaintiff's
business; the nature and extent of the use the defendant intended for the secret;
and finally whatever other unique factors in the particular case which might have
affected the parties' agreement such as the ready availability of alternative proc-
esses.
Id. at 151-52 (quoting Univ. Computing, 504 F.2d at 539).
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Accordingly, the applicability of the University Computing and other
factors derived from Georgia-Pacific in determining reasonable royal-
ties for alleged trade secret misappropriation cases is widely recog-
nized.92
Moreover, these factors can often have a significant effect on the
plaintiffs ability to recover damages. For example, as in the case of
lost profits and unjust enrichment damages, the existence of accept-
able alternatives must be considered in evaluating royalty damages.
The "ready availability of alternative processes" is one of the factors
specifically identified in University Computing and reiterated in cases
such as Vermont Microsystems.93 If acceptable alternatives are readily
available in the marketplace, then the value of the intellectual property
will be diminished or even reduced to zero.94 Accordingly, application
of the factors identified in University Computing in light of patent law
precedents often can have a significant effect on a plaintiffs damages
case.
V. DISAGGREGATION AND APPORTIONMENT OF DAMAGES
Beyond the specific rules governing each of the three damages
measures discussed above, there are other, more fundamental princi-
ples that apply to any damages analysis and which are therefore com-
mon to both patent and trade secret claims. One such principle is that
92. Courts often cite the University Computing factors in evaluating trade secret royalty
claims. See, e.g., Am. Sales Corp. v. Adventure Travel, Inc., 862 F. Supp. 1476, 1479 (E.D. Va.
1994) (" University Computing... is especially helpful with damages in determining when to con-
sider certain factors and in defining what a 'reasonable royalty' is. There, the court analogized
these cases to the determination of damages in patent infringement cases, where there is much
more precedent."); Litton Sys., 1993 WL 317266, at *2 (reciting the University Computing factors
and observing that "courts have considerable leeway in calculating a damage award for trade se-
crets theft").
Similarly, the Restatement (Third) of Unfair Competition identifies the University Computing
factors in describing the factors courts routinely employ in "determining the amount of a reason-
able royalty." RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 45 reporters' note (1995).
The ABA model jury instructions reiterate the factors applied in University Computing, although
they do not list all of the factors identified in that case. See ABA MODEL JURY INSTRUCTIONS
§ 8.06[3] (3d ed. 1996).
93. See University Computing, 504 F.2d at 539; Vt. Microsystems, 138 F.3d at 450.
94. See Hughes Tool Co. v. G.W. Murphy Indus., Inc., 491 F.2d 923, 930-31 (5th Cir.
1974) ("The existence of a non-infringing alternative reduces the value of the patent and thus the
damages from infringement."). As one commentator as observed:
A final factor to be considered [in determining a reasonable royalty for patent in.
fringement] is the availability of noninfringing substitutes. The theory follows that a
licensee would have been less disposed to agree to a high royalty if he had available
noninfringing alternatives that were equal or nearly equal in terms of cost and per-
formance. If the patent holder can present no evidence from which a court may derive
a reasonable royalty, the court has the discretion to award no damages.
Pincus, supra note 6, at 126.
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there must be some causal nexus between a plaintiffs injury and the
claimed damages.
This principle has been reaffirmed in a variety of contexts. In
antitrust cases, for example, courts have consistently ruled that plain-
tiffs may recover damages only for the defendant's unlawful acts.9"
Any damages attributable to lawful conduct cannot be recovered. Ac-
cordingly, "the courts have been consistent in requiring plaintiffs to
prove in a reasonable manner the link between the injury suffered and
the illegal practices of the defendant."96 In order for an award of dam-
ages to be proper, "there must be some nexus between the damages
claimed and the injury incurred."97 Thus, "[w]hen a plaintiff improp-
erly attributes all losses to a defendant's illegal acts, despite the pres-
ence of significant other factors, the evidence does not permit a jury to
make a reasonable and principled estimate of the amount of dam-
age."98 "If injury is shown to be attributable to factors for which the
95. See generally Maxwell M. Blecher & James Robert Noblin, The Confluence of Muddied
Waters: Antitrust Consequential Damages and the Interplay of Proximate Cause, Antitrust Injury,
Standing and Disaggregation, 13 ST. JOHN'S J. LEGAL COMMENT. 145 (1998); Charles N. Char-
nas, Segregation of Antitrust Damages: An Excessive Burden on Private Plaintiffs, 72 CAL. L. REV.
403 (1984); James R. McCall, The Disaggregation of Damages Requirement in Private Monopoliza-
tion Actions, 62 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 643 (1987); M. Sean Royall, Disaggregation of Antitrust
Damages, 65 ANTITRUST L.J. 311, 311 (1997) (discussing disaggregation rule, which "holds that
where an antitrust plaintiff challenges multiple discrete acts or practices as unlawful, damages
cannot be proved in the aggregate"); id. at 343 ("Depending upon the circumstances of the case
and the point in the proceedings at which the issue is raised, the unjustified failure of an antitrust
plaintiff to disaggregate its damage proof can have a variety of consequences, ranging from the
requirement of a new trial to dismissal of the plaintiffs claims as a matter of law.").
96. MCI Communications Corp. v. AT&T Co., 708 F.2d 1081, 1161 (7thCir. 1983).
97. Tronzo v. Biomet, Inc., 156 F.3d 1154, 1161 (Fed. Cir. 1998); see also Associated Gen.
Contractors of Cal., Inc. v. Cal. State Council of Carpenters, 459 U.S. 519 (1983).
The common law [of tort] required the plaintiff to prove, with certainty, both the ex-
istence of damages and the causal connection between the wrong and the injury. No
damages could be recovered for uncertain, conjectural, or speculative losses. Even if
the injury was easily provable, there would be no recovery if the plaintiff could not
sufficiently establish the causal connection.
Id. at 533 n.26; Fleet Nat'l Bank v. Anchor Media Television, Inc., 45 F.3d 546, 560 (1st Cir.
1995) (concluding that there was "an absence of proof of damages" where there was a failure to
show "the existence of a causal nexus between the damages sought and the breach or tort"); Doe
v. United States, 976 F.2d 1071, 1085-86 (7th Cir. 1993) ("damages awards may not be based on
mere intuition or speculation alone, and the trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding that
a causal relationship was insufficiently established"); Van Dyk Research Corp. v. Xerox Corp.,
478 F. Supp. 1268, 1326 (D.N.J. 1979), affd, 631 F.2d 251 (3d Cir. 1980); Argus Inc. v. East-
man Kodak Co., 612 F. Supp. 904, 918 (S.D.N.Y. 1985) ("In order to recover for antitrust inju-
ries, a plaintiff in an antitrust case must establish a causal link between the alleged loss and the
unlawful conduct."), affid, 801 F.2d 38 (2d Cir. 1986).
98. Va. Panel Corp. v. MAC Panel Co., 133 F.3d 860, 873 (Fed. Cir. 1997); see also Farley
Transp. Co. v. Santa Fe Trail Transp. Co., 786 F.2d 1342, 1351 (9th Cir. 1985) (holding dam-
ages opinion inadmissible where plaintiff failed "to present any evidence permitting the jury to
parse out which damages were attributable to the unlawful competition"); City of Vernon v. S.
Cal. Edison Co., 955 F.2d 1361, 1373 (9th Cir. 1992) (concluding that there was "no proper
Seattle University Law Review [Vol. 25:821
defendant cannot be held liable, then a damage case that ignores these
factors must fail." 99
For example, in MCI Communications Corp. v. AT&T Co., the
Seventh Circuit reversed a jury verdict on the grounds that the plain-
tiffs purported damages included sums attributable to claims of
unlawful competition that had been dismissed.' The court observed
that the plaintiffs damages study had been conducted based on
twenty-two alleged unlawful acts.1"' By the time the case was tried,
however, the district court had dismissed seven of the twenty-two
counts.' Thus, the plaintiff proffered a damages theory that would
allow it to recover for claims that had been dismissed. The court con-
cluded that because the verdict awarded "damages for both lawful and
unlawful conduct, the damage award must be set aside."'0 3 In so rul-
ing, the court observed that "[i]t is essential ... that damages reflect
only the losses directly attributable to unlawful competition.'
0 4
proof of damages at all" and upholding summary judgment against plaintiff for failure to prove
damages where study failed to disaggregate damages); Amerinet, Inc. v. Xerox Corp., 972 F.2d
1483, 1504 (8th Cir. 1992) (ruling that plaintiff failed to establish damages on the grounds that
"[i]n its proof of tort damages, as in its proof of antitrust damages, [plaintiff] made no effort to
distinguish the effect of other probable causes of its business decline from the effects of [defen-
dant's] alleged tortious behavior"); Litton Sys., Inc. v. AT&T Co., 700 F.2d 785, 825 (2d Cir.
1983) ("damage studies are inadequate when only some of the conduct complained of is found to
be wrongful and the damage study cannot be disaggregated"); First Sav. Bank, F.S.B. v. U.S.
Bancorp, 117 F. Supp. 2d 1078, 1084 (D. Kan. 2000) (excluding expert report and testimony as
"inherently unreliable and purely speculative" where expert "improperly attributed all losses to
the defendants' allegedly illegal acts, despite the presence of other factors that could be signifi-
cant to his analysis").
99. In re IBP Peripheral EDP Devices Antitrust Litig., 481 F. Supp. 965, 1013 (N.D. Cal.
1979), affd, 698 F.2d 1377 (9th Cir. 1983). Commentators have summarized the rationale be-
hind this rule as follows:
Where an antitrust plaintiff challenges multiple business practices of the defendant
yet fails to disaggregate its proof of damages, two related problems arise: First, an ag-
gregated damage study renders it impossible for the trier of fact to be satisfied that the
harm complained of flows from the defendant's unlawful acts as opposed to wholly
independent factors including the defendant's lawful procompetitive conduct. Sec-
ond, an aggregated damage model leaves the jury without a reasonable basis for de-
termining the amount by which the plaintiff's damage model figure should be reduced
in the event that one or more of the challenged business practices are not found to be
exclusionary.
Royall, supra note 95, at 316-17.
100. MCI Communications, 708 F.2d at 1166-67.
101. Id. at 1163.
102. Id. at 1162.
103. Id. at 1160.
104. Id. at 1161. Courts have, however, sometimes indicated that disaggregation is only
required where it is practicable. See, e.g., Spray-Right Serv. Corp. v. Monsanto Co., 684 F.2d
1226 ,1242-43 (7th Cir. 1982) ("A plaintiff claiming injury caused by more than one of the de-
fendant's unlawful practices need not prove the amount of damage caused by each illegal practice
if the plaintiff shows that disaggregation is impracticable."), affd, 465 U.S. 752 (1984); Litton
Sys., Inc. v. Honeywell, Inc., 1996 WL 634213, at *2 (C.D. Cal. July 24, 1996) ("Except in cir-
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An analogous principle has long been applied in the context of
patent infringement claims."' 5 For example, over one hundred years
ago in Garretson v. Clark,10 6 the Supreme Court addressed the neces-
sity of apportioning damages between that which has been patented
and that which has not. The case involved a patent for "an improve-
ment in the method of moving and securing in place the movable jam
cumstances where disaggregation is shown to be impossible or impractical, an antitrust plaintiff
challenging a variety of conduct is required to segregate damages attributable to particular busi-
ness practices.").
Nonetheless, plaintiffs must provide some showing that disaggregation is impossible, and,
even then, it is not guaranteed that the plaintiff will prevail:
[A]s a general matter, antitrust plaintiffs must be cautious in relying upon the imprac-
ticability exception to the disaggregation rule. In most situations it will not be enough
for a plaintiff to present expert testimony to the effect that disaggregation would have
been impracticable. If the expert did not in fact attempt disaggregation (e.g., Vernon,
Litton v. Honeywell, Southern Pacific Communications), such testimony will likely be
rejected. Moreover, if the expert concedes (or the defendant shows) that disaggrega-
tion, though perhaps difficult, would have been possible, this in most instances will be
enough to defeat the plaintiffs impracticability claim.
Royall, supra note 95, at 351.
The question raised here is whether, assuming an antitrust plaintiff shows that disag-
gregation in fact was impracticable, this automatically excuses the plaintiff from the
requirement of providing segregated damage proof. In most cases it will not.... The
Spray-Rite decision clearly should not be read to suggest that any time an antitrust
plaintiffs damage expert testifies that it would have been impracticable to disaggre-
gate, this testimony will carry the day.
Id. at 337-38.
105. See, e.g., Crystal Semiconductor Corp. v. Tritech Microelectronics, 246 F.3d 1336,
1353 (Fed. Cir. 2001) ("To recover lost profits, 'a patent owner must prove a causal relation be-
tween the infringement and its loss of profits."' (quoting BIC Leisure Prods. v. Windsurfmg
Int'l, Inc., 1 F.3d 1214, 1218 (Fed. Cir. 1993)); Computing Scale Co. v. Toledo Computing
Scale Co., 279 F. 648, 670 (7th Cir. 1921) ("It is a cardinal rule of patent law that, where a patent
produces but a part of the profits, the plaintiff may recover only such part of the profits as the
patent produces, and the defendant may have credit for the remainder .... ); Ga.-Pac. Corp. v.
U.S. Plywood Corp., 318 F. Supp. 1116 (S.D.N.Y. 1970).
There is a basic distinction between a patent which is only a part of a machine or
structure and which creates only a part of the profits and, on the other hand, a pat-
ented article or a patent which gives the entire value to the combination or an article
patented as an entirety. Consequently, it is necessary to determine where the inven-
tion extends to and affects the whole article, giving it its essential marketability, or
whether it is only for an improvement.
Id. at 1131; SCHLICHER, supra note 6, § 9.05[2][k], at 9-82 ("Since at least the 1850s, patent law
required that a patent owner separate or apportion some part of the profits from the production
and sale of a product containing a patented 'improvement."').
The courts insisted that the value of the invention must be distinguished from the
value the entire product or process would have had without it. They typically framed
that inquiry by instructing patent owners to prove the difference between the value of
a product using the invention and the value that product would have had if the next
best substitute invention were employed.
Id.
106. Garretson v. Clark, 111 U.S. 120 (1884).
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or clamp of a mop-head.""1 7 As the Court observed, "[w]ith the ex-
ception of this mode of clamping, mop-heads like the plaintiffs had
been in use time out of mind."'
'1 8
Despite the fact that its patent related to only one feature of the
mop head, the plaintiff had attempted to recover all of the profits on
sales of mop heads. In rejecting this approach, the Court ruled that
the plaintiff could not recover all of the profits:
When a patent is for an improvement, and not for an entirely
new machine or contrivance, the patentee must show in what
particulars his improvement has added to the usefulness of the
machine or contrivance. He must separate its results distinctly
from those of the other parts, so that the benefits derived from it
may be distinctly seen and appreciated.0 9
As a result, the patentee "must in every case give evidence tending to
separate or apportion the defendant's profits and the patentee's dam-
ages between the patented feature and the unpatented features, and
such evidence must be reliable and tangible, and not conjectural or
speculative." 0
However, the Court also articulated a principle that became
known as the "entire market value rule.""' Under this rule, a plaintiff
107. Id. at 121.
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. Id. In an earlier decision, Seymour v. McCormick, the Supreme Court noted the ab-
surd results that would follow if courts failed to apportion the damages attributable to patent in-
fringement:
If the measure of damages be the same whether a patent be for an entire machine or
for some improvement in some part of it, then it follows that each one who has pat-
ented an improvement in any portion of a steam engine or other complex machines
may recover the whole profits arising from the skill, labor, material, and capital em-
ployed in making the whole machine, and the unfortunate mechanic may be com-
pelled to pay treble his whole profits to each of a dozen or more several inventors of
some small improvement in the engine he has built. By this doctrine even the small-
est part is made equal to the whole, and "actual damages" to the plaintiff may be con-
verted into an unlimited series of penalties on the defendant.
57 U.S. 480, 490-91 (1853).
111. See, e.g., Del Mar Avionics, Inc. v. Quinton Instrument Co., 836 F.2d 1320, 1327
(Fed. Cir. 1987) (discussing entire market value rule); TWM Mfg. Co. v. Dura Corp., 789 F.2d
895, 901 (Fed. Cir. 1986) ("The entire market value rule allows for the recovery of damages
based on the value of an entire apparatus containing several features, when the feature patented
constitutes the basis for customer demand."); Kori Corp. v. Wilco Marsh Buggies & Draglines,
Inc., 761 F.2d 649, 656 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (the "'financial and marketing dependence on the pat-
ented item under standard marketing procedures' . . . determines whether the non-patented fea-
tures of a machine should be included in calculating compensation for infringement"); Paper
Converting Machine Co. v. Magna-Graphics Corp., 745 F.2d 11, 22-23 (Fed. Cir. 1984);
Leesona Corp. v. United States, 599 F.2d 958, 974-75 (Fed. Cir. 1979).
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might recover all of the profits from sales of a machine if it could
"show, by equally reliable and satisfactory evidence, that the profits
and damages are to be calculated on the whole machine, for the reason
that the entire value of the whole machine, as a marketable article, is
properly legally attributable to the patented feature.""' 2  Under the
facts in Garretson, however, the Court concluded that this rule did not
apply given that "it could not be pretended that the entire value of the
mop-head was attributable to the feature patented."".3
Later courts and commentators have elaborated upon this rule,
noting that "[t]o recover the entire value of the apparatus, the patent
holder must demonstrate that the patented feature of the apparatus
drove the sale, that is, served as the basis for customer demand of the
entire machine."" 4 Nonetheless:
For a discussion of this rule, see SCHLICHER, supra note 6, § 9.05[2][k], at 9-93. Ansems and
McDaniel describe the rule as follows:
The "entire market value rule" often refers to the situation where the patented and
unpatented components are somehow connected, or comprise one apparatus. The
term generally refers to the situation where, in a suit for patent infringement, a patent
holder seeks compensation for the value of an entire apparatus that contains at least
one patented feature, and perhaps several unpatented features.
McDaniel & Ansems, supra note 6, at 467. Other commentators have noted the lengthy pedigree
of the rule:
The "entire market value rule" is a third factor which courts take into consideration in
determining profits lost due to patent infringement. Under this rule, if the entire
commercial value of the product is dependent upon the patented feature, then the en-
tire profit from the good is utilized in computing the damage award. While this doc-
trine was first stated in Goulds Manufacturing Co. v. Cowing, many later cases have re-
affirmed it.
Pincus, supra note 6, at 116.
112. Garretson, 111 U.S. at 121. This was not the first time, however, that the Court ap-
plied such a principle. For example, in Manufacturing Co. v. Cowing, the Court stated:
It does not necessarily follow.., that where the patent is for one of the constituent
parts, not for the whole of a machine, the profits are to be confined to what can be
made by the manufacture and sale of the patented part separately .... If the im-
provement is required to adapt the machine to a particular use, and there is no other
way open to the public of supplying the demand for that use, then it is clear the in-
fringer has by his infringement secured the advantage of a market he would not oth-
erwise have had, and that the fruits of this advantage are the entire profits he has
made in that market.
Mfg. Co. v. Cowing, 105 U.S. 253, 255 (1881).
113. Garretson, 111 U.S. at 121-22.
114. McDaniel & Ansems, supra note 6, at 467. See also Rite-Hite Corp. v. Kelley Co., 56
F.3d 1538, 1549 (Fed. Cir. 1995) ("We have held that the entire market value rule permits re-
covery of damages based on the value of a patentee's entire apparatus containing several features
when the patent-related feature is the 'basis for customer demand."'); King Instrument Corp. v.
Otari Corp., 767 F.2d 853, 865 (Fed. Cir. 1985) ("The 'entire market value' rule allows for the
recovery of damages based on the value of an entire apparatus including non-patented parts, even
though only one of the features in the apparatus is patented."); W. Elec. Co. v. Stewart-Warner
Corp., 631 F.2d 333, 341 (4th Cir. 1980) ("[D]amages... are properly calculated on the entire
product when 'the entire value of the whole machine, as a marketable article, is properly and le-
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When the patented component does not serve as the basis of
customer demand for the entire machine, but rather represents
only a small part of the total value of the machine, the court en-
gages in an "apportionment" analysis. Apportionment requires
a court to undertake the difficult task of determining the relative
contribution of the patented feature to the value of the entire
structure. 115
Under this test, "[i]t is the patent holder's burden to establish a suffi-
cient nexus between the infringement and the claimed losses."'
116
The apportionment requirement similarly has been applied in
the context of trade secret misappropriation claims. 17 Indeed, the
Uniform Trade Secrets Act itself and its embodiments in the laws of
the various states recognize that the plaintiff may recover only those
damages that are "caused by misappropriation.""1 As a result, vari-
ous courts have applied the apportionment principle when considering
trade secret damages claims based on unjust enrichment, royalty, and
lost profits calculations. 19
One of the most influential cases to apply this principle in the
context of a trade secret misappropriation claim is Schiller & Schmidt,
Inc. v. Nordisco Corp.2 ' In Schiller, the Seventh Circuit upheld a dis-
trict court ruling rejecting the plaintiff expert's analysis of damages for
theft of a customer list where that analysis included various compo-
nents not attributable to the defendant's alleged misappropriation. 21
The expert claimed that the plaintiff was entitled to all the profits it
galy attributable to the patented feature."' (citing Westinghouse Elec. & Mfg. Co. v. Wagner
Elec. & Mfg. Co., 225 U.S. 604 (1912)).
115. McDaniel & Ansems, supra note 6, at 467.
116. Id. at 478.
117. See Runiks v. Peterson, 392 P.2d 590, 590 (Colo. 1964) ("[B]efore damages can be
awarded to a claimant he must establish that the damages he seeks are traceable to and are the
direct result of the wrong sought to be redressed."); Johnson, Assessing Damages, supra note 4, at
72 ("The amount of R&D damages recoverable may be limited by the scope of the 'secret' (or
nonpublic) information comprising the 'trade secret."').
118. See, e.g., UNIF. TRADE SECRETS Act § 3(a) (1985) (plaintiff may recover "actual loss
caused by misappropriation" or "unjust enrichment caused by misappropriation").
119. See, e.g., Nilssen v. Motorola, Inc., 1998 WL 851493, at *1- 3 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 1,
1998) (reasonable royalty); KW Plastics v. U.S. Can Co., 131 F. Supp. 2d 1289, 1295 (M.D. Ala.
2001) (expert improperly "assume[d] that each and every penny that KW gained constitutes un-
just enrichment"); Schiller & Schmidt, Inc. v. Nordisco Corp., 969 F.2d 410, 415-16 (7th Cir.
1992) (lost profits calculation "made a joke of the concept of expert knowledge"); cf. Softel, Inc.
v. Dragon Med. & Scientific Communications Ltd., 891 F. Supp. 935, 943 (S.D.N.Y. 1995) ("In
measuring defendants' profits, it is also appropriate to apportion damages based on the role
plaintiffs trade secret played in the commercial success of defendants' product." (citing Univ.
Computing v. Lykes-Youngstown Corp., 504 F.2d 518, 539 (5th Cir. 1974)), aff'd, 118 F.3d 955
(2d Cir. 1997).
120. 969 F.2d 410 (9th Cir. 1992).
121. Id. at 415-16.
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allegedly lost after the theft of its customer list, despite the fact that
"95 percent of the names on the list came from mailing lists compiled
by product manufacturers and purchasable by any catalog house" and,
therefore, were not "secrets. "122
The court observed that, at a minimum, the plaintiffs expert
"should have tried to separate the damages that resulted from the law-
ful" conduct of the defendant "from the damages that resulted from
particular forms of misconduct allegedly committed by that competi-
tor, of which the theft of the mailing list, however morally reprehensi-
ble, was the slightest.' 2'  Because the expert failed to exclude such
sums from his calculations, the court concluded that the expert's
analysis made "a joke of the concept of expert knowledge."1
24
After the Supreme Court's decision in Daubert requiring that ex-
pert evidence meet certain threshold requirements concerning reliabil-
ity in terms of both methodology and foundation, courts began to ap-
ply this principle under the rubric of assessing the reliability of an
expert's damages methodology. A recent case, KW Plastics,125 is in-
structive. In that case, the court ruled that an expert's testimony con-
cerning purported trade secret damages must be excluded where the
expert did "not attempt to determine the value of the specific trade se-
crets used."' 26 Relying upon the Seventh Circuit's analysis in Schiller,
the court observed that an expert must demonstrate a connection be-
tween the particular trade secrets misappropriated and the damages
claimed, and not simply "assume that each and every penny [the al-
leged wrongdoer] gained constitutes unjust enrichment. ' 127 Thus, the
court excluded the expert's opinion regarding unjust enrichment on
the grounds that it "fails to meet the reliability and relevancy stan-
dards required by Daubert and its progeny. "128
Similarly, in Vermont Microsystems, the Second Circuit rejected a
damages award that encompassed damages beyond those attributable
to the alleged trade secrets.2 9 The court ruled that the damages evi-
dence was flawed in that the damages award was based on "all tech-
nologies developed or worked on" by a former employee. 3 ° In so do-
ing, the court looked to the Georgia-Pacific factors for determining
reasonable royalties, which specifically incorporate an apportionment
122. Id. at 415.
123. Id. at 415-16.
124. Id. at 415.
125. KW Plastics v. U.S. Can Co., 131 F. Supp. 2d 1289 (M.D. Ala. 2001).
126. Id. at 1295.
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. Vt. Microsystems, Inc. v. Autodesk, Inc., 88 F.3d 142, 151 (2d Cir. 1996).
130. Id. at 151-52.
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analysis by identifying as a factor to consider in determining the
amount of any royalty damages "the portion of the realizable profit
that should be credited to the invention as distinguished from non-
patented elements, the manufacturing process, business risks, or sig-
nificant features or improvements added by the infringer."131
This principle has also been applied to disaggregate damages at-
tributable to the use of different forms of intellectual property. In
Nilssen v. Motorola, Inc., for example, the court rejected the plaintiffs
damage theory, which sought recovery for sums attributable to "all of
[the plaintiffs] technology," including both patent and trade secret
rights. 3 2 The plaintiff sought to introduce as a damage figure a num-
ber that had been discussed in negotiations between the parties as a
possible value for all of the plaintiffs patent and trade secret rights re-
lating to electronic ballasts.'33 However, according to the court, intro-
duction of this figure as a purported measure of the plaintiff's trade
secret damages would "create a gross potential for unfair prejudice and
jury confusion" and "would be patently misleading."'34 Accordingly,
the court excluded the testimony of plaintiffs damages expert on the
grounds that the expert's proffered royalty calculation encompassed
intellectual property that was "far more expansive" than the "limited
claimed trade secret rights at issue.""'3 As the court observed, under
Rule 702, it was "especially important to keep such uninformed and
irrelevant expert testimony from the jury." '136 Thus, the court con-
cluded that "the dangers that would be inherent in introducing an un-
anchored number that would invite sheer speculation on the jury's
part are too obvious to be compelled to repeat."' 3 7
On appeal, the Seventh Circuit discussed this analysis while re-
viewing the district court's decision to bifurcate the plaintiffs trade
secret and patent claims into two separate lawsuits. In overturning the
bifurcation decision, the Seventh Circuit "remand[ed] with instruc-
tions to consolidate [the trade secret] proceeding with the patent-law
proceeding." '138 In so ruling, however, the court seemed to endorse the
district court's analysis of the plaintiffs proffered damages theory. It
observed that the district court's ruling requiring the plaintiff to "cal-
131. Ga.-Pac. Corp. v. U.S. Plywood Corp., 318 F. Supp. 1116, 1120 (S.D.N.Y. 1970).
132. Nilssen v. Motorola, Inc., 1998 WL 513090, at *6 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 14, 1998).
133. Id. at *6-*8.
134. Id. at *6-*7 (granting motion in limine to exclude documents and argument under
Rule 403).
135. Nilssen v. Motorola, Inc., 1998 WL 851493, at *2-*3 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 1, 1998) (grant-
ing motion in limine excluding expert's damages testimony).
136. Id. at *2 (emphasis added).
137. Nilssen, 1998 WL 513090, at *7 n.13.
138. Nilssen v. Motorola, Inc., 255 F.3d 410, 415 (7th Cir. 2001).
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culate trade secret damages independently of patent damages" had
been "necessitated by the segregation of legal theories into separate
lawsuits." '139
Because of its decision overturning the bifurcation of the case,
the court observed that on remand the district court should not "block
[the expert's] testimony solely by invoking the law of the case" based
on its prior decision and that it may be "prudent for the district court
to take a fresh look at the admissibility of [the expert's] testimony once
patent and trade-secret theories are reunited" in a single suit. 4° Thus,
the Seventh Circuit implicitly recognized that the plaintiff could not
recover damages based on its patent rights when they were excluded
from the plaintiffs lawsuit.
Finally, the apportionment principle has also been applied in a
different form to require that an expert disaggregate damages where
multiple trade secrets are alleged. In Children's Broadcasting Corp. v.
Walt Disney Co., the Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court's ruling
that an expert's damages testimony was "speculative and based solely
on conjecture" where the expert claimed that "any misappropriation of
any trade secret caused the exact same amount of damage" to the
plaintiff.' The plaintiff in that case had alleged that the defendant
misappropriated seven different trade secrets; the jury found that only
two of these were in fact trade secrets.' In ordering a new trial, the
court reasoned that "[t]he assertion that any or all of the alleged
wrongful acts would have caused the same outcome is dubious" and
observed that, under Daubert, such expert testimony is properly ex-
cluded because there is 'simply too great an analytical gap between
the data and the opinion proffered."" 43 Accordingly, the court re-
manded for a new trial on damages given that the expert's testimony
had been improperly admitted.'44
139. Id. at 413-14 (emphasis added). The Seventh Circuit also indicated in passing, how-
ever, that
the district judge never explained how it would have been possible (or practical) to
calculate trade-secret damages on the assumption that Motorola did not infringe any
of Nilssen's patents, or patent damages on the assumption that Motorola did not use
any of Nilssen's trade secrets. In the parties' negotiations-and, Nilssen insists, in
Motorola's creation of its electronic ballasts-the trade secrets and patents were tied
together, if only because the trade secrets concern the use of ideas reflected in the pat-
ents.
Id. at 413.
140. Id. at 414.
141. Children's Broad. Corp. v. Walt Disney Co., 245 F.3d 1008, 1018 (8th Cir. 2001).
142. Id. at 1014.
143. Id. at 1018 (quoting Gen. Elec. Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 522, 146 (1997)).
144. Id. at 1013.
2002]
Seattle University Law Review
This ruling represents an expansion of the apportionment princi-
ple in the sense that in cases such as Nilssen, where the court ruled that
sums that clearly were not attributable to the alleged trade secrets (be-
cause they were attributable to patent rights not at issue) must be ex-
cluded. In Children's Broadcasting, in contrast, the court struck down
a damages analysis that failed to disaggregate damages attributable to
various alleged trade secrets, which the jury may have found were
misappropriated. A similar extension of the disaggregation principle
can be found in the antitrust context where "[e]ven in cases in which
the full range of conduct challenged by the plaintiff remains in contro-
versy, some courts have held that an antitrust plaintiffs failure to dis-
aggregate renders its proof unduly speculative."' 45 Such a rule is justi-
fied on the grounds that, if damages are not disaggregated, should the
jury find liability on less than all of the alleged unlawful acts, it will
have no basis to assess damages.
In addition to the numerous cases addressing this principle, the
necessity of apportionment has also been recognized in the Restate-
ment. The Restatement (Third) of Unfair Competition observes that
"[i]f the secret accounts for only a portion of the profits earned on the
defendant's sales, such as when the trade secret relates to a single
component of a product marketable without the secret, an award to the
plaintiff of defendant's entire profit may be unjust." '146 Further, the
Restatement states that, under such circumstances, the court may often
tailor royalty damages to ensure that the plaintiff only recovers that
portion of the damages attributable to the alleged misappropriation. 147
Thus, as the Restatement acknowledges, royalty damages often repre-
sent an apportionment of the unjust enrichment received by the de-
fendant through profits derived in part from the misappropriated
technology.
Indeed, the court in University Computing relied on patent law
precedents in coming to this same conclusion. In making this obser-
vation, the court cited Egry Register Co. v. Standard Register Co., 148 a
145. Royall, supra note 95, at 319. See also id. at 325 ("Some courts have held that, regard-
less of whether the jury (or the court) may find that each of the defendant's challenged actions
was unlawful, it remains incumbent upon the plaintiff to disaggregate its damage proof to the
fullest extent possible.").
146. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 45 cmt. f (1995).
147. Id. ("The royalty that the plaintiff and defendant would have agreed to for the use of
the trade secret made by the defendant may be one measure of the approximate portion of the
defendant's profits attributable to the use.").
148. Egry Register Co. v. Standard Register Co., 23 F.2d 438 (6th Cir. 1928). Commenta-
tors have also observed that in the patent context:
The apportionment problem is also addressed in the reasonable royalty measure. The
Supreme Court said that the goal of the reasonable royalty award was to identify an
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patent infringement case in which the court was charged with deter-
mining damages attributable to the infringement of a patent on a de-
vice that was incorporated into cash registers. As the University Com-
puting court observed, the Sixth Circuit in Egry concluded that it was
inequitable to award damages based on "the total profits the defendant
had made on all sales of the machines using this device." 149 Accord-
ingly, the court ruled that the proper measure of damages was a rea-
sonable royalty that apportioned the profits on sales of the cash regis-
ters:
Because no actual apportionment of profits based on what per-
centage of the success of the marketing of the machines was due
to the plaintiffs device could be shown, the court held the
proper measure of damages would be a reasonable royalty on de-
fendant's sales, thereby creating an apportionment of profits
based on an approximation of the actual value of the infringed
device of the defendant.'
Nonetheless, the decisions regarding apportionment are not al-
ways uniform. One area in which there seems to be some disagree-
ment is the proper placement of the burden of proof in assessing what
portion of a defendant's profit is attributable to the alleged trade se-
crets. One view is that expressed in a footnote in Jet Spray Cooler, Inc.
v. Crampton.'' The court in Jet Spray indicated that once a plaintiff
amount that represents the value of the invention, given "the nature of the invention,
its utility and advantages." This meant that the royalty should be based on the utility
and advantages this invention provided beyond those available from use of the next
best alternative. In other words, the Court was requiring that the royalty measure be
set based on the marginal value of the invention .... The Court was insisting that
the apportionment issue be addressed in setting the reasonable royalty.
SCHLICHER, supra note 6, § 9.05[2][k], at 9-91 to 9-92 (quoting Dowagiac Mfg. Co. v. Minn.
Moline Plow Co., 235 U.S. 641, 648 (1915)).
149. Univ. Computing v. Lykes-Youngstown Corp., 504 F.2d 518, 537 (5th Cir. 1974).
150. Id. at 536.
151. Jet Spray Cooler, Inc. v. Crampton, 385 N.E.2d 1349, 1358 n.14 (Mass. 1979). The
court in University Computing also cited Westinghouse, claiming that in that case, "the Court put
the burden of proving factors other than the infringed patent caused the profits on the infringer
once the plaintiff patentee proved profits were made." Univ. Computing, 504 F.2d at 536 n.28.
See also Carter Prods., Inc. v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., 214 F. Supp. 383, 397 (D. Md. 1963) (un-
der Westinghouse, "the defendant infringer assumes the burden of showing that part of the profit
is attributable to features other than those covered by the patent."); Curtis Mfg. Co. v. Plasti-
Clip Corp., 933 F. Supp. 94, 104 (D.N.H. 1995). Jager describes the burden of proof as follows:
The second method of assessing damages is to measure the defendant's gain. This
approach typically calls for an account of defendant's net profits from sales attributed
to the trade secret. In this situation, the plaintiff has the burden to establish the de-
fendant's sales related to the trade secret. The burden of proof then switches to the
defendant to show which sales are unrelated and what expenses should be deducted to
establish net profit.
JAGER, supra note 4, at § 3.03[6][b][i], at 3-61.
Seattle University Law Review
demonstrates that the defendant made profits on sales of a product
that was made using the plaintiffs alleged trade secrets, the burden
shifts to the defendant to conduct an apportionment and to show what
portion of the profits is not attributable to the alleged trade secrets.
1 2
In coming to this conclusion, the court in Jet Spray relied upon
patent infringement precedents such as Westinghouse Electric &
Manufacturing Co. v. Wagner Electric & Manufacturing Co.'53 Argua-
bly, however, the court misread these cases. In Westinghouse, the Su-
preme Court reaffirmed the principle established in Garretson that "if
plaintiffs patent only created a part of the profits, he is only entitled
to recover that part of the net gains." '154 The Court recognized that
under this principle the plaintiff "[m]ust . . . 'give evidence tending to
separate or apportion the defendant's profits and the patentee's dam-
ages between the patented feature and the unpatented features, and
such evidence must be reliable and tangible, and not conjectural or
speculative."' ' Specifically, the Court ruled that "[w]here profits are
made by the use of an article patented as an entirety, the infringer is
liable for all the profits 'unless he can show-and the burden is on him
to show-that a portion of them is the result of some other thing used
by him."15 6 This is the exact opposite of the interpretation offered in
Jet Spray. In Westinghouse, the Supreme Court merely indicated that
where the plaintiff "has proved the existence of profits attributable to
his invention, and demonstrated that they are impossible of accurate
or approximate apportionment," the burden shifts to the defendant to
present contrary evidence showing that apportionment is impossi-
ble.15
7
152. See, e.g., Prandl, supra note 1, at 453 ("Once the plaintiff has shown the existence of
the defendant's profits, the burden shifts to the defendant to demonstrate the portions of his
profits which are not attributable to the trade secret."); cf. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR
COMPETITION § 45 cmt. f (1995) ("The plaintiff is entitled to recover the defendant's net prof-
its. The plaintiff has the burden of establishing the defendant's sales; the defendant has the bur-
den of establishing any portion of the sales not attributable to the trade secret and any expenses
to be deducted in determining net profits.").
153. Jet Spray Cooler, 385 N.E.2dat 1358 n.14.
154. Westinghouse Elec. & Mfg. Co. v. Wagner Elec. & Mfg. Co., 225 U.S. 604, 615
(1912).
155. Id.
156. Id. at 614. See also Dowagiac Mfg. Co. v. Minn. Moline Plow Co., 235 U.S. 641,
643-44 (1915) (noting that "the plaintiff failed to carry the burden, rightly resting upon it, of
submitting evidence whereby the profits from the sale of the infringing drills could be appor-
tioned between the patented improvements and the unpatented parts"); Rockwood v. Gen. Fire
Extinguisher Co., 37 F.2d 62, 65 (2d Cir. 1930) ("The burden of apportionment was on the
plaintiffs, for it was only entitled to recover such part of the commingling profits as was attribut-
able to the use of its invention.").
157, Westinghouse, 225 U.S. at 621.
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Thus, while the effect of these rules governing the burden of
proof is hard to discern, the "burden shifting" discussed in Westing-
house comes into play only after the plaintiff has demonstrated the im-
possibility of apportionment and not before, as the court in Jet Spray
seemed to suggest.' 8 Indeed, implicit in cases such as KW Plastics
and, indeed, in the entire Daubert approach to scrutinizing proffered
expert testimony, is that it is the plaintiffs burden to present reliable
and methodologically sound expert testimony regarding damages.
Accordingly, a damages expert may not proffer a damages theory that
is obviously flawed. The better approach (and that established in
Westinghouse) would exclude those damages theories that fail to prop-
erly apportion damages unless the plaintiffs expert offers some af-
firmative analysis demonstrating the impossibility of apportion-
ment. '59
Finally, it is interesting to note the intersection between the ap-
portionment rules and the consideration of alternatives or substitutes.
As noted above, where alternatives are not perfect substitutes, dam-
ages may be computed by comparing differences in cost or profit asso-
ciated with the alternative product or process and the technology at is-
sue. In conducting an apportionment analysis, courts may similarly
compare the prior product or process, or even alternative or substitute
products or processes, with that product or process incorporating the
technology at issue to determine the portion of the value of the entire
product or process that is attributable to the infringed technology.16 °
158. See SCHLICHER, supra note 6, § 9.0512][k], at 9-85 ("A patent owner was able to re-
ceive an award of the infringer's entire profits only if it proved that the infringer would have
made no profits had it not used the particular invention for which damages were being as-
sessed."). As Schlicher observes, in Westinghouse,
[t]he Court seemed content that the burden of proof in this action should have rested
on the patent owner. However, the Court was not content that the burden of proof
should operate in the normal way. The burden on the patent owner was to try to
prove apportionment. If he could not, this burden essentially shifted to the infringer.
The Court did not say how hard the patent owner had to try. The consequence of
such a "burden of proof" is difficult to assess.
Id. § 9.05[2][k], at 9-90 to 9-91.
A similar rule has been applied in the antitrust context. See, e.g., Spray-Right Serv. Corp. v.
Monsanto Co., 684 F.2d 1226 (7th Cir. 1982).
A plaintiff claiming injury caused by more than one of the defendant's unlawful prac-
tices need not prove the amount of damage caused by each illegal practice if the plain-
tiff shows that disaggregation is impracticable. If the plaintiff shows that such proof
is impracticable, the burden shifts to the defendant to demonstrate the contrary.
Id. at 1243.
159. Arguably, this should include an analysis demonstrating that apportionment cannot
be accomplished through a reasonable royalty. See, e.g., Univ. Computing v. Lykes-
Youngstown Corp., 504 F.2d 518, 536 (5th Cir. 1974).
160. As Schlicher explains:
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Thus, the numerous patent cases evaluating alternatives in the context
of patent infringement claims may provide valuable precedent in de-
termining the proper apportionment of damages in trade secret cases.
VI. OTHER COMMON LIMITATIONS BASED ON THE RELATIONSHIP
BETWEEN THE PARTIES
In addition to the rules governing apportionment, other common
limitations on damages may flow from the nature of the relationship
between the parties. One instance in which the relationship between
the parties may be particularly significant is where the defendant and
the plaintiff are not in direct competition. For example, where the de-
fendant is the plaintiffs customer, awarding lost profits may be inap-
propriate, given that the defendant may have a veto on any alleged
"lost sales" independent of the alleged misappropriation. In other
words, in the "but for" world, had the defendant not misappropriated,
it may never have purchased any of the plaintiff's product at all.
Such potential limitations have been addressed only rarely in the
case law. However, the analysis found in those cases that do address
such limitations demonstrates that they make abundant sense. For ex-
ample, in Stickle v. Heublein, Inc., the Federal Circuit rejected a lost
profits claim brought against a company that purchased and used-
but did not manufacture-a product that allegedly infringed the plain-
tiffs patent. The court observed that "the possibility of [the plain-
tiffs] proving lost profits" based on such a claim was "highly specula-
",161tive.
Similarly, in Trans-World Manufacturing v. Al Nyman & Sons,
Inc., the court rejected a lost profits claim for patent infringement,
where the defendant was the plaintiffs customer and, therefore, could
refuse to buy the plaintiff's product. 162  The case involved some dis-
plays that allegedly infringed upon the plaintiffs patent rights. 163 In
denying the plaintiffs claim for lost profits, the court observed that
The value of the invention is not necessarily equal to the difference between the de-
mand for the product actually sold and its production cost. If there was a substitute
invention available that would have permitted the patent owner or infringer to gener-
ate 99 percent of those profits, then only 1 percent of them are logically attributable to
use of the invention. In order to gauge the derived demand for the invention, it is
necessary to assess the availability of substitute inventions. For that purpose, it is
necessary to inquire about the nature and value of the product that the infringer could
have made had he not infringed.
SCHLICHER, supra note 6, § 9.0512][1], at 9-95.
161. Stickle v. Heublein, Inc., 716 F.2d 1550, 1560 (Fed. Cir. 1983).
162. Trans-World Mfg. v. Al Nyman & Sons, Inc., 633 F. Supp. 1047, 1054-55 (D. Del.
1986).
163. Id. at 1049.
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the defendant "used, rather than sold, the displays." '164 The court rea-
soned that, given "the unique bargaining position" enjoyed by a cus-
tomer that can refuse to buy the plaintiff's product as "compared to
the average infringer," there is not "a reasonable probability that (the
plaintiff] would have made the sales but for [the defendant's] infring-
ing activity." '165 Accordingly, to award lost profits "would involve the
court in improper speculation." '166
Finally, in GNB Battery Techs., Inc. v. Exide Corp., the court re-
jected lost profits damages for alleged patent infringement, where the
plaintiff's customer "had become dissatisfied with the quality of
GNB's batteries." '167 Here, again, while the defendant in GNB was
not the actual customer of the plaintiff, the court concluded that the
plaintiff could not recover lost profits damages where there was evi-
dence that the plaintiff's customers would not have made the pur-
chases absent the alleged infringement.
Such analysis appears to be even more rare in the context of trade
secret misappropriation claims. 68 Nonetheless, a few courts seem to
have recognized a similar principle. In Trans-Rim Enterprises (USA),
Ltd. v. Adolph Coors Co., for example, the Tenth Circuit reviewed an
unpublished district court ruling rejecting a lost profits claim flowing
from the defendant's alleged trade secret misappropriation and failure
to enter into a joint venture with the plaintiff.169 The plaintiff main-
tained that because the defendant misappropriated its trade secrets
and then refused to enter into the joint venture, it was entitled to re-
cover all of the profits it allegedly lost as a result of the defendant's
failure to enter into the proposed business arrangement. 7 ° The dis-
trict court flatly rejected this proposed measure of damages as too
speculative given that the defendant "was not contractually obligated
to participate" in the proposed joint venture and thus the plaintiff
164. Id. at 1054.
165. Id. at 1053-55.
166. Id.
167. GNB Battery Techs., Inc. v. Exide Corp., 886 F. Supp. 420, 437-38 (D. Del. 1995),
affd, 78 F.3d 605 (Fed. Cir. 1996).
168. However, some commentators have observed that lost profits damages for alleged
trade secret misappropriation are generally most appropriate where the parties are competitors.
See, e.g., Johnson, Assessing Damages, supra note 4, at 72 ("A party also may recover damages for
its lost sales and profits resulting from the misappropriation of its trade secrets. This measure of
damages is generally applied where the defendant is a direct competitor of the plaintiff and uses
the misappropriated trade secrets to sell a competing product.").
169. Trans-Rim Enters. (USA), Ltd. v. Adolph Coors Co., 1995 WL 231381, at *1-*3
(10th Cir. Apr. 7, 1995). While the Tenth Circuit in Trans-Rim discussed the district court's
damages ruling at length, it did not reach the merits of that ruling, but rather decided the case on
other grounds.
170. Id. at*l.
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could not "prove... that 'but for' [the defendant's] wrongdoing the
project would have come to fruition." '' Thus, as in Transworld,
where the profits in the "but for" world could only be realized after
some action by the defendant, the plaintiffs recovery of such damages
on the assumption that the defendant would have taken such action
was ruled to be too speculative.
Similarly, the court in Web Communications Group, Inc. v. Gate-
way 2000, Inc. ruled that where the defendant was not the plaintiffs
competitor, but rather a customer, unjust enrichment based upon the
defendant's profits should be barred.12 The plaintiff in Gateway was
an advertising firm that alleged that Gateway had misappropriated its
trade secrets in collusion with one of the plaintiffs competitors by
purchasing advertising brochures from the competitor, which were
manufactured according to an advertising format the plaintiff claimed
as its trade secret. 73 The court ruled that, while the competing adver-
tising firm may have been unjustly enriched through profits it received
on the advertising brochures it sold to Gateway, Gateway's profits on
its computer sales were "not the correct measure of damages., 74 In
coming to this conclusion, the court observed that Gateway was "not a
competitor" and therefore had "not wrested a competitive advantage
from [the plaintiff] in a manner normally associated with a trade se-
crets case involving a claim for unjust enrichment."'' Consequently,
the court held that "Gateway's savings ... would represent the unjust
enrichment, if any, that occurred in this case. 176
Other courts have similarly observed that lost profits may not be
an appropriate measure of damages where the plaintiff and defendant
are not competitors. In Pioneer Hi-Bred, for example, the Eighth Cir-
cuit noted in passing that "[t]he selection of lost profits as the appro-
priate [damages] measure in this case ... presented formidable prob-
lems stemming from the fact that [the defendant] does not directly
compete with [the plaintiff]."' 77  In University Computing, the court
171. Id. at*2.
172. Web Communications Group, Inc. v. Gateway 2000, Inc., 1994 WL 171448, at *2
(N.D. I11. May 3, 1994).
173. Id. at 1.
174. Id. at*2.
175. Id.
176. Id.; see also Web Communications Group, Inc. v. Gateway 2000, Inc., 1995 WL
23535, at *1 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 17, 1995) (granting motion in limine to bar evidence of Gateway's
sales and profits because the "[competitor's] profits and Gateway's savings that stemmed from
the alleged misappropriation of trade secrets would represent the unjust enrichment that may
have occurred in this case").
177. Pioneer Hi-Bred Int'l v. Holden Found. Seeds, Inc., 35 F.3d 1226, 1244 (8th Cir.
1994). Proving that an alleged trade secret confers a competitive advantage is also an element
necessary to establish liability for trade secret misappropriation. "A trade secret must be valu-
[Vol. 2S:821
Trade Secret Damages
arguably went even further, contending that lost profits were not an
appropriate remedy, given that the plaintiff still retained use of the se-
cret, unless the alleged trade secret had actually been destroyed in
some fashion such as through public disclosure:
In some instances courts [in trade secret cases] have attempted
to measure the loss suffered by the plaintiff. While as a concep-
tual matter this seems to be a proper approach, in most cases the
defendant has utilized the secret to his advantage with no obvi-
ous effect on the plaintiff save for the relative differences in their
subsequent competitive positions. Largely as a result of this
practical dilemma, normally the value of the secret to the plain-
tiff is an appropriate measure of damages only when the defen-
dant has in some way destroyed the value of the secret. The
most obvious way this is done is through publication, so that no
secret remains. Where the plaintiff retains the use of the secret,
as here, and where there has been no effective disclosure of the
secret through publication the total value of the secret to the
plaintiff is an in appropriate measure.1 78
Nonetheless, the court acknowledged that damages based on the plain-
tiffs loss might be appropriate where "some specific injury to the
plaintiff can be established-such as lost sales." '179 Otherwise, how-
ever, the court maintained that "the loss to the plaintiff is not a par-
ticularly helpful approach in assessing damages.""18
Accordingly, while there appears to be only limited precedent
specifically addressing constraints on available damages flowing from
the nature of the relationship between the parties, such rules may be
appropriate nonetheless. Indeed, rather than resulting from any dis-
approval of such limitations by courts that are asked to consider them,
the lack of precedent may result from the fact that the defendant and
plaintiff in trade secret or patent cases are usually in direct competi-
tion, and such limitations would rarely be relevant.
able either to plaintiff or to its business rivals in the sense that, as long as it is secret, the informa-
tion provides plaintiff with an actual or potential competitive business advantage over its rivals."
ABA MODEL JURY INSTRUCTIONS § 8.03[3], at 380 (3d ed. 1996); cf. Computer Care v. Serv.
Sys. Enters., 982 F.2d 1063, 1074 (7th Cir. 1992) (trade secret combination must give rise to a
"unified process design and operation of which in unique combination affords a competitive ad-
vantage and is a protectable trade secret").
178. Univ. Computing v. Lykes-Youngstown Corp., 504 F.2d 518, 535 (5th Cir. 1974).
179. Id. at 336.
180. Id.
20021
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VII. LIMITATIONS ON THE DURATION OF THE DAMAGES PERIOD
Finally, while there are many common limitations on damages
available in patent and trade secret cases, certain limitations found in
the context of trade secret claims do not exist in the patent context.
One significant difference arises in determining the duration of the
damages period. Under applicable trade secret law, "[t]he damage pe-
riod should be gauged by the time the information would have re-
mained unavailable to the defendant in the absence of the misappro-
priation.' ' 81  Unlike a patent, where a party is given a monopoly and
the right to exclude others from using its intellectual property,'82 trade
secret law only protects intellectual property as long as it remains "se-
cret."
One corollary of this principle is that a plaintiff may not recover
damages once its alleged secrets have been publicly disclosed. 8 '
181. JAGER, supra note 4, § 7.03[4], at 7-109.
182. See Am. Can Co. v. Mansukhani, 742 F.2d 314, 329 (7th Cir. 1984) ("The owner ofa
trade secret is not entitled to prevent others from using public information to replicate his prod-
uct, nor may the owner prevent others from making similar products which are not derived from
the trade secret."); Droeger v. Welsh Sporting Goods Corp., 541 F.2d 790, 792 (9th Cir. 1976)
("[T]he ownership of a trade secret does not give the owner a monopoly in its use, but merely a
proprietary right which equity protects against usurpation by unfair means."); JAGER, supra note
4, § 3.02, at 3-25 to 3-26 ("[A] trade secret does not give the owner a monopoly over the idea.
Others are free to use precisely the same idea, as long as they obtain their knowledge through
their own independent efforts.") (citing Greenberg v. Craydon Plastics Co., 378 F. Supp. 806,
812 (E.D. Pa. 1974)).
183. Pioneer Hi-Bred Int'l v. Holden Found. Seeds, Inc., 35 F.3d 1226, 1235 (8th Cir.
1994) ("By definition, trade secret law does not protect information in the public domain or oth-
erwise readily ascertainable."); Computer Care v. Serv. Sys. Enters., 982 F.2d 1063, 1072 (7th
Cir. 1992) (no trade secret existed where plaintiff had failed to "demonstrate that any of its al-
leged trade secrets are not either 'within the realm of general skills and knowledge' in the car ser-
vice industry"); Litton Sys., Inc. v. Sundstrand Corp., 750 F.2d 952, 958 (Fed. Cir. 1984)
("Matters of broad public knowledge or of general knowledge in an industry cannot constitute
confidential information or trade secrets .... [A] trade secret cannot consist of information that
is common knowledge, even where the information is imparted in the context of a confidential
relationship.") (citations omitted); Clark v. Bunker, 453 F.2d 1006, 1009 (9th Cir. 1972) ("Mat-
ters of public knowledge or of general knowledge in an industry cannot be appropriated by one as
his secret."); Nickelson v. Gen. Motors Corp., 361 F.2d 196, 199 (7th Cir. 1966) ("Matters of
public knowledge or of general knowledge in an industry cannot be appropriated by one as his
secret."); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 39 cmt. f (1995) ("If the infor-
mation has become readily ascertainable from public sources so that no significant benefit ac-
crues to a person who relies instead on other means of acquisition, the information is in the pub-
lic domain and no longer protectable under the law of trade secrets."); id. § 45 cmt. c ("[Tlhe
value of a trade secret that has been destroyed through public disclosure is often speculative.");
Johnson, Assessing Damages, supra note 4, at 72 ("[Bjecause a trade secret loses its protection
when it enters the public domain, damages for lost profits are generally cut off from the point the
trade secret is disclosed and, hence, loses its character as a 'secret."'); Prandl, supra note 1, at
452.
The duration of the accounting period may be limited by two factors: 1) the public
disclosure of the trade secret, and 2) the application of the so-called "head start" rule,
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Where an alleged trade secret is already a matter of public knowledge,
its value is essentially zero. In particular, when a patent discloses in-
formation, the information is in the public domain and does not qual-
ify for trade secret protection.
18 4
A second corollary of this principle is that trade secret damages
must be limited to the "head start period." Parties are free to obtain
alleged trade secret information by reverse engineering products that
are available in the marketplace." 5 If information is readily duplicated
without considerable time, energy, or expense, it does not qualify for
trade secret protection, and the plaintiff may not recover damages.8 6
which limits the accounting period to the time that the defendant would have needed
to reproduce the plaintiffs product in a legal manner.
Id.
184. Injection Research Specialists, Inc. v. Polaris Indus., L.P., 1998 WL 536585, at *8
(Fed. Cir. Aug. 13, 1998) ("It is well established that, once a patent is published, the subject
matter of that patent is no longer entitled to trade secret protection."); Rototron Corp. v. Lake
Shore Burial Vault Co., 712 F.2d 1214, 1215 (7th Cir. 1983) (holding that plaintiff had no trade
secrets in the rotational molding process after issuance of patents on process because "the grant
of a patent automatically constitutes full disclosure of the patented process"); Scharmer v. Car-
rollton Mfg. Co., 525 F.2d 95, 99 (6th Cir. 1975) ("The property right in a trade secret ceases to
exist after the secret has become public property through general disclosure. If a trade secret is
patented there is no further right to secrecy."); Nilssen v. Motorola, Inc., 963 F. Supp. 664, 676
n.14 (N.D. I11. 1997) ("Trade secret protection is unavailable for information disclosed in a pat-
ent, as 'the grant of a patent automatically constitutes full disclosure of the patented process."');
Inorganic Coatings, Inc. v. Falberg, 1996 WL 39472, at *4 (E.D. Pa. 1996) ("Because such in-
formation was already disclosed as part of a patent application, [plaintiff] has not met its burden
of showing that its disclosures regarding the manufacturing process '[were] unique as opposed to
unprotected "general secrets of the trade."'"); Stutz Motor Car of Am., Inc. v. Reebok, Int'l,
Ltd., 909 F. Supp. 1353 (C.D. Cal. 1995), affd, 113 F.3d 1258 (Fed. Cir. 1997).
It is well established that disclosure of a trade secret in a patent places the information
comprising the secret into the public domain. Once the information is in the public
domain and the element of secrecy is gone, the trade secret is extinguished and 'the
patentee's only protection is that afforded under the patent law.' This black-letter
rule is rooted in principles of the supremacy of federal law.
909 F. Supp. at 1359; cf. Prandl, supra note 1, at 453 ("Courts have sometimes adhered to the
view, but not always that the damages terminate on the date of issuance of a patent that embodies
the trade secret.").
185. See also Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 154 (1989)
("Trade secret law provides far weaker protection in many respects than the patent law.... The
public at large remained free to discover and exploit the trade secret through reverse engineering
of products in the public domain or by independent creation."); Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron
Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 476 (1974) (trade secret law "does not offer protection against discovery by
fair and honest means, such as by independent invention, accidental disclosure, or by so-called
reverse engineering, that is by starting with the known product and working backward to divine
the process which aided in its development or manufacture"); Flotec, Inc. v. S. Research, Inc., 16
F. Supp. 2d 992, 1000 (S.D. Ind. 1998) ("[T]he process known as 'reverse engineering,' in which
a skilled person studies a product and figures out how to produce it, is permissible and even en-
couraged under trade secret law.").
186. See, e.g., C&F Packing Co. v. IBP, Inc., 224 F.3d 1296, 1302 (Fed. Cir. 2000). ("[I]f
the information can be readily duplicated without involving considerable time, effort or expense,
then it is not secret."); Computer Care, 982 F.2d at 1072 (the "key" to whether information is a
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However, if the time it would take to duplicate the alleged trade se-
crets is not de minimis, then the head start period comes into play.
The head start period is the period of time that it would take a party to
independently develop the alleged trade secrets. Because a plaintiff is
entitled to recover damages only so long as the information may re-
main a secret, a number of courts have ruled that a plaintiff cannot re-
cover damages beyond the head start period."8 7
The reasoning behind these requirements is discussed in the Re-
statement (Third) of Unfair Competition:
Monetary remedies, whether measured by the loss to the plain-
tiff or the gain to the defendant, are appropriate only for the pe-
riod of time that the information would have remained unavail-
able to the defendant in the absence of the appropriation. This
period may be measured by the time it would have taken the de-
fendant to obtain the information by proper means such as re-
verse engineering or independent development. Similarly, the
issuance of a patent or other public disclosure of the information
by the plaintiff or a third person terminates the secrecy neces-
sary to the protection of the trade secret.188
trade secret is "the ease with which information can be developed through other proper means");
id. (plaintiff failed to demonstrate that the alleged trade secrets were not subject to being "'read-
ily duplicated without involving considerable time, effort or expense'); Nilssen, 963 F. Supp. at
675 (plaintiff "must first prove that his information was sufficiently secret-in the sense of not
being duplicable without 'considerable time, effort or expense'-to constitute a 'trade secret.'
Only then does the further 'misappropriation' analysis become relevant.").
187. See, e.g., Univ. Computing v. Lykes-Youngstown Corp., 504 F.2d 518, 535 (5th Cir.
1974) ("(Tlhe protection afforded a trade secret is limited-for it is protected only so long as
competitors fail to duplicate it by legitimate, independent research."); Connar Prods. Corp. v.
Universal Slide Fastener Co., 172 F.2d 150, 156 (2d Cir. 1949); Schiller & Schmidt, Inc. v. Wal-
lace Computer Servs., Inc., 1991 WL 270170, at *6 (N.D. I11. 1991) (A plaintiff "is only entitled
to protection for the period of time it would take a legitimate competitor to acquire the secret
information on his own."), affd in part, vacated in part, United States v. Sanchez, 969 F.2d 1410
(7th Cir. 1992); JAGER, supra note 4, § 7.03[2][a], at 7-98 ("[T]he trade secret and the right to an
injunction and damages for misappropriation terminate upon public disclosure of the secret.
This cutoff can arise from the issuance of a related patent.") (citing Lewis & Co. v. Buddy L
Corp., 453 F. Supp. 392 (S.D.N.Y. 1978)); Id., § 7.03[21[a], at 7-107.
The damage period should be gauged by the time the information would have re-
mained unavailable to the defendant in the absence of the misappropriation. Dam-
ages for the use of the trade secret after the information is public can be measured by
the amount needed to compensate for the head start or other unfair advantage gained
by the defendant.
Id. But see Johnson, Assessing Damages, supra note 4, at 72 ("Courts are split as to whether dam-
ages for lost profits are limited to the time period that it would have taken the defendant to inde-
pendently develop the trade secrets without the misappropriation, sometimes referred to as the
'head start' rule.").
188. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 45 cmt. h (1995); see also
Rosenhouse, supra note 2, at § 13[b] ("In general, the duration of an accounting period in a case
of trade secret misappropriation may be limited by two factors: the presence of a disclosure
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In this manner, the requirements for demonstrating liability merge
with those for establishing damages.
Much like the other limiting principles described above, these
rules governing the duration of the damages period are derivative of
the requirement that a plaintiff demonstrate "but for" causation of
damages. As the court explained in Sokol Crystal Products, Inc. v.
DSC Communications Corp., "[t]he point of the 'head start' period is
that, once the defendant has discovered, or would have discovered, the
trade secret without the misappropriation, any lost profits from that
time forward are not caused by the defendant's wrongful act."' 9 In
contrast, there is no "head start" or "public disclosure" limitation in
analyzing patent damages, given that patents are by definition not "se-
cret." Inventors are given a patent in order to induce them to make
their inventions public. The "head start" period is replaced by the pe-
riod of the patent before its expiration. Accordingly, this is one of the
few areas in which the analogy between patent and trade secret dam-
ages breaks down.
VIII. CONCLUSION
This article has attempted to demonstrate the many ways in
which the principles that have been developed in the context of evalu-
ating patent damages claims can be applied with equal effect in the
context of trade secret misappropriation claims. As the above analysis
shows, the application of such principles has not always been uniform.
In some areas, such as the factors used in evaluating royalties (or to a
lesser extent apportionment of damages), courts evaluating trade secret
claims have readily applied the principles developed in patent cases.
In other areas, however, such as the analysis of acceptable alternatives
in the context of lost profits claims, courts have remained relatively si-
lent. However, all of these principles may be usefully applied to
screen out those claims that are not sufficiently reliable or are method-
ologically flawed.
Moreover, application of patent law precedents in the context of
trade secret damages claims should increase uniformity in the rules
that determine damages. There are numerous factors that have led to
greater uniformity in the development of patent, as opposed to trade
secret, law. Chief among these is a uniform body of statutory law in-
terpreted by federal instead of numerous state courts. Further, with
which may destroy the secrecy, and thus the trade secret status, of the information involved; and
the application of the so-called 'head start' rule.").
189. Sokol Crystal Prods., Inc. v. DSC Communications Corp., 15 F.3d 1427, 1433 (7th
Cir. 1994).
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the establishment of the Federal Circuit, a court designed specifically
to address patent law issues, the uniformity and consistency in the
rules governing damages in the patent infringement context has in-
creased. By applying the principles that courts have developed in pat-
ent cases to trade secret claims, a measure of uniformity may be
achieved in the damages context where such uniformity is arguably
desirable, given that rules governing damages flow from economic
principles of universal applicability.
More importantly, however, by referring to patent law prece-
dents, courts that are charged with analyzing trade secret damages
claims will have the advantage of a body of law both that has been
built up over the course of decades and that, in most areas relating to
damages, is arguably more sophisticated and complete.
